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INTRODUCTION
Promoting economic development is a traditional and long accepted
governmental function, and there is no principled way of distinguishing it
from the other public purposes the Court has recognized.1

Just like state and local governments, Indian tribes, as separate sovereign
governments, have an obligation to improve the lives of their citizens. When such
governmental entities engage in economic development activities to elevate the
economic status of their constituencies, they often seek outside funding to finance
those activities. Many tribal governments, however, are still suffering from the
impacts of deleterious historical federal policies.2 Additionally, tribal communities
are often burdened with extremely low socio-economic factors, including low
*
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educational achievement,3 high unemployment,4 high poverty,5 and low per capita
income.6 For many tribes the only sources of capital to address these problems are
limited to grants and other assistance from the federal government, but such funds
are often insufficient to address the myriad responsibilities facing tribal
governments.7
Contrary to popular belief, gaming does not provide sufficient funds to meet
the needs of all tribal governments, as most of the more than 560 federally
recognized Indian tribes8 do not have any form of gaming operations,9 and of those
that do, only a small handful generate significant revenues.10 While a small number
of tribes near major metropolitan centers have started successful gaming
enterprises, hundreds of tribes have not entered the gaming industry, and many that
have participated actually operate casinos located far from population centers.11
Most reservations are characterized by extensive land bases, spread out
communities, and homesteads mired in one long-standing poverty cycle.12 In fact,
the need for economic development in Indian Country remains acute and impacts
nearly every aspect of reservation life, as most Indian tribes have an economy that
is on par with third world countries. The unemployment rate, for example, hovers
around 50 percent for Indians who live on reservations, nearly ten times that for
the nation as a whole, and almost one third of American Indians live in poverty.13
All too many tribal governments lack the ability to provide the basic
infrastructure most U.S. citizens take for granted, such as passable roadways,
affordable housing, and the plumbing, electricity, and telephone services that come
with a modern home. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, approximately 20% of
American Indian households on reservations lack complete plumbing facilities,
compared to 1% of all U.S. households. About 1 in 5 American Indian reservation
households dispose of sewage by means other than public sewer, septic tanks, or
3
Raymond C. Ettcity, Report of the Advisory Committee on Tax Exempt and Government
Entities (ACT), p. II-7.
4
Average unemployment on Indian reservations is 13.6% (with some reservations having
unemployment levels above 50%). The general U.S. population has unemployment rate of 5.8%. See
U.S. Census Bureau 2000.
5
The average percentage of American Indians living in poverty is 25.67%, compared 12.38%
for the general population. See U.S. Census Bureau 2000.
6
Per capital income for American Indians is $12,893.00, compared to the overall U.S. average
of $21,587.00. See U.S. Census 2000.
7
Ettcity at p. II-7
8
“Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the United States Bureau of
Indian Affairs,” Federal Register, November 25, 2005 (Volume 70, Number 226), p. 71193
9
According to the National Indian Gaming Association, only 217 tribes have gaming operations
of any kind (cite to NIGA stats).
10
See National Gambling Impact Survey Commission Report, p. 2-10 (“The 20 largest Indian
gambling facilities account for 50.5 percent of total revenues, with the next 85 accounting for [only]
41.2 percent. Additionally, not all gambling facilities are successful. Some tribes operate their casinos
at a loss and a few have even been forced to close money-losing facilities.”)
11
See Donald L. Barlett and James B. Steele, Wheel of Misfortune, TIME, December 16, 2002.
12
“Entrepreneurial Sector is the Key to Indian Country Development,” Indian Country Today,
September 6, 2002 at p. A2.
13
See Tex Hall, The Native American Capital Formation and Economic Development Act of
2003: Testimony on Senate Bill 519, 2003.
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cesspool.14 The Navajo reservation is the same size as West Virginia, yet it only
has 2,000 miles of paved roads while West Virginia has 18,000 miles.15 Obviously,
roads, telephones, electricity, and the like are taken for granted by investors and
employers even in the most distressed inner cities of the United States. Their
absence from large portions of Indian country poses a daunting barrier to tribal
leaders’ attempts to attract new private sector investment and jobs.
Such realities highlight the importance of stimulating economic development
to create economic opportunity for tribal members. Many scholars, investors, and
tribal officials charged with developing their economies are well aware that access
to capital for tribes and individual Indian entrepreneurs is a significant and
pressing problem. The unanswered question is one of capital formation: How do
tribes obtain the necessary capital to build a permanent economic base? The
answer should be to access the capital markets in the same way that state and local
governments do to finance their own economic development activities, but as this
article will demonstrate, severe impediments to a level playing field continue to
plague Indian Country.
State and local governments obtain revenues to finance their operations
primarily through three channels: tax revenues, borrowing, and federal grants.16
Borrowing has increasingly become a favored method of raising revenue for state
and local governments.17 These entities may, with some exceptions, issue so called
“tax-exempt” bonds.18 This tax-exempt status of municipal bonds has been a part
of the Federal Tax Code since its adoption in 1913.19 Fippinger explains that a taxexempt bond is “a debt security in which the interest portion of the debt service
paid is not included in gross income.”20 The tax-exempt status of municipal debt
allows state and local governments to issue bonds at lower interest rates, since the
income from those bonds results in the same net level of income for taxpayers in
higher tax brackets.
To illustrate this phenomenon, assume that a taxpayer whose effective tax rate
is 40 percent purchases a $1000 taxable bond from a corporation that pays interest
of 10 percent. She will receive an annual interest payment of $100, but she must
14
Statistical Brief, Housing of American Indian on Reservations - Plumbing. 1995, Bureau of
the Census
15
Michael J. Kurman, Indian Investment and Employment Tax Incentives, 41 FED. B. NEWS & J.
578 ( 1994).
16
M. David Gelfand, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEBT FINANCING, §1.04, Clark Boardman
Callaghan (2003)
17
Such obligations fall under the heading of “municipal securities” in Section 3(a)(29) of the
1934 Act. The applicable definition under this section for our purposes describes a municipal security
as “direct obligations of, or obligations guaranteed as to principal or interest by, a State or any
political subdivision thereof, or any agency or instrumentality of a State or any political subdivision
thereof, an any municipal corporate instrumentality of one or more states…” Therefore, municipal
security or municipal debt, when used in this article, can refer to a state, municipality, or an agency or
instrumentality of either.
18
I.R.C. §103 (1986).
19
Eric J. Gouvin, Radical Tax Reform, Municipal Finance, and the Conservative Agenda, 56
RUTGERS L. REV. 409, 424 (2004).
20
Robert A. Fippinger, THE SECURITIES LAW OF PUBLIC FINANCE, §1:2.2, Practicing Law
Institute (2002).
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pay $40 of that in taxes, resulting in a net income of $60. If she were to purchase a
$1000 tax-exempt bond from a municipality that pays 6 % in interest, she would
still receive $60 and would be economically indifferent between the two bonds,
assuming that all other attributes of the bonds were equivalent, such as the risk of
default and the dates of payment. Thus, the municipality can raise the same amount
of capital as the corporation for substantially less in interest expense.
Unfortunately, such advantage is not universally available in Indian Country.
While many tribal economies still resemble those of a third world country, a small
number of tribal economies have been able to expand,21 and approximately 15% of
the tribes22 have been able to obtain debt financing from a variety of lenders23 to
finance economic development activities and infrastructure improvements.24 Most
tribes, however, are still unable to access the capital markets competitively, if at
all. A primary roadblock to capital markets is the discriminatory provisions of the
1982 Indian Tribal Governmental Tax Status Act (“Tribal Tax Status Act”),25 part
of the Internal Revenue Code (“Tax Code”). While the goal of the Tribal Tax
Status Act was to treat tribes just as states are treated in the Tax Code,26 the act
falls far short of achieving the goal of equal treatment desired by tribes,27 and in
fact substantially limits the ability of tribes to raise debt for economic development
activities. Although the Tribal Tax Status Act extended “certain tax provisions to
American Indian Tribal governments on the same basis as such provisions apply to
States,”28 it did not recognize tribes as equivalent to states for all tax purposes,
specifically denying them the elements of public finance that they desired most.29
While the federal policy of exempting from federal taxation interest paid on
state bonds issued to finance and effectuate state policy is a recognition and
affirmation of that state’s sovereignty, a similar recognition and affirmation of
sovereignty unfortunately does not extend to Indian tribes because tribes face two
additional restrictions that do not apply to their state and local governmental
counterparts. In the first instance, unlike state and local governments, Indian tribes
21

See FELIX COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN INDIAN LAW, 2005 ed., §21.03, hereinafter
HANDBOOK III (Professor Clarkson was a contributing author for this most recent edition of the
HANDBOOK, providing material on tribal finance, tribal corporations, economic development, and
intellectual property). Two earlier editions of the Handbook are also referenced in this article. Felix
Cohen’s original Handbook was published in 1941 (hereinafter HANDBOOK I). The Handbook was
substantially revised and reissued in 1982 (hereinafter HANDBOOK II).
22
IRS Research Summary, on file with the author. This research summary is the result of a joint
research project between the author and the Tax Exempt Bonds division of the IRS.
23
Fitch Ratings Report, “Tribal Governments in the Bond Market,” February 4, 2004, p. 1
24
Townsend Hyatt, Perry E. Israel, Alan Benjamin, An Introduction to Indian Tribal Finance
(published by Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP) 2004. See also HANDBOOK III, §21.03.
25
Title II of Pub. L. No. 97-473, 96 Stat. 2608 (1982) (codified at I.R.C. §7871) (2004)
[hereinafter Tribal Tax Status Act].
26
See 127 Cong. Rec. S5666, S5667 (daily ed. June 2, 1981) (remarks of Sen. Wallop (RWyo.)).
27
See, e.g., Robert A. Williams, Small Steps on the Long Road to Self-Sufficiency for Indian
Nations: The Indian Tribal Governmental Tax Status Act of 1982, 22 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 335 (1985);
Ellen P. Aprill, Tribal Bonds: Indian Sovereignty and the Tax Legislative Process, 46 ADM. L. REV.
333 (Summer 1994).
28
Senate Report No. 97-646 (1982), section I (summary).
29
See HANDBOOK III supra note 21, §21.03[2][c].
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cannot issue private activity bonds.30 Worse, however, is the Tribal Tax Status
Act’s “additional requirement”31 that tribal tax-free bond proceeds only be used for
“essential governmental functions,”32 a restriction not applicable to state and
municipal bonds.33
The damage to tribal economic prospects was compounded when the act was
amended in 1987 to clarify that tribes can only issue tax-free bonds for projects
“customarily”34 financed by states and local governments (e.g., schools, roads,
government buildings, etc.).35 Thus, Indian tribes can only issue tax-exempt debt if
“substantially all” of the borrowed proceeds “are to be used in the exercise of any
essential governmental function.”36 In addition, section 7871(e) states that “the
term ‘essential governmental function’ shall not include any function which is not
customarily performed by State and local governments with general taxing
powers” but does not provide any guidance as to when a particular activity
becomes “customary” for a municipal government. As the tax-base of a tribe is
usually insufficient for a tribe to issue general obligation bonds37 and since the
revenue from a revenue bond is usually linked to the project being financed,38 this
additional restriction to “customary” governmental activity places tribes at a
tremendous disadvantage relative to the capital markets and is inequitable when
compared to other forms of municipal debt.
The narrow interpretation of this language by the Internal Revenue Service
(“IRS”) has had a demonstrably stifling effect on tribes’ tax-free bonding
authority.39 These restrictions on the scope of what can be financed with taxexempt debt in particular deny poor tribes the opportunity to address their glaring
infrastructure and economic development needs. Tribes with substantial natural
resources or significant gaming operations have the option of financing certain
activities on a taxable basis even if, absent a restrictive Tax Code, they would be
able to finance those activities on a tax-exempt basis. Poorer tribes, however, do
not have that luxury, and upwards of $50 billion in annual capital needs go unmet
in Indian Country,40 in part because the debt service required to finance the
30
See Williams supra note 27, at 382; Aprill supra note 27 at 335; see also Hyatt, Israel, et al,
supra note 24, p. 19 (“State and local governments often issue tax-exempt private activity bonds for
the benefit of nonprofit corporations, or to finance mortgage loans for first-time low- and moderateincome home buyers, or to finance low- and moderate-income residential rental property. Private
activity bonds are also issued for airports, docks, and wharves, solid waste facilities, sewage
facilities, and certain other facilities.”). Under current law, Indian tribes are barred from issuing
private activity bonds for anything other than a tribal manufacturing facility. 26 USC §§7871(c)(2)(c)(3).
31
I.R.C. §7871(c).
32
I.R.C. §7871(c)(1).
33
See HANDBOOK III supra note 21, §21.03[2][c].
34
I.R.C. §7871(e)
35
See H. R. No. 100-391 at 1139, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
36
26 USC §7871(c)(1). “Substantially all” is not defined in the statute but is believed to mean at
least 95% of the proceeds. See Hyatt, Israel, et al, supra note 24, p. 18
37
See Williams supra note 27, at 385 (“few Indian communities enjoy the thriving economic
environment necessary to sustain a stable tax base”).
38
See Aprill supra note 27, at 342.
39
See HANDBOOK III supra note 7, §21.03[2][c].
40
See Henson, E. and J. Taylor, Native America at the New Millennium, Harvard Project on
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projects to meet those needs is too expensive at taxable rates.41
The deleterious impact of these discriminatory restrictions can be seen in the
relative paucity of tribal tax-exempt financings. For the years 2002, 2003, and
2004, state and local governments issued an average of 14,038 tax exempt bonds.42
Over the same period, tribal governments annually issued an average of five taxexempt bonds.43 In dollar terms, for the years 2002-2004, state and local
governments issued on average $363.6 billion of tax-exempt debt44 while tribal
governments issued on average only $202 million of tax-exempt debt.45
Given the relative numbers of municipal and tribal issuers,46 the expected
number of tribal tax-exempt issues should be more than an order of magnitude
higher. American Indians account for more than 1.5% of the national population,
yet tribes issue less than one tenth of one percent of the tax-exempt bonds each
year.47

State authority
Local authority
District
City, Town or Village
State
County /Parish
College or University
Direct Issuer
Co-op Utility
Indian tribe
Total

2002 2002 Par Amount
Issues
(US$ mil)

2003 2003 Par Amount
Issues
(US$ mil)

2004 2004 Par Amount
Issues
(US$ mil)

1,943
2,109
4,351
4,062
272
1,047
199
69
4
4
14,056

1,978
2,141
4,613
4,330
262
1,146
226
56
6
14,752

1,884
1,837
4,298
3,782
241
961
235
68
5
13,306

125,595.7
59,156.1
54,509.7
46,948.4
34,042.4
23,325.1
7,045.9
3,991.1
930.0
194.4
355,544.4

119,013.3
62,572.7
56,560.5
54,526.9
48,401.7
24,479.3
8,929.4
4,244.1
233.2
378,727.9

102,837.4
57,197.4
58,235.3
53,368.7
47,042.6
23,182.0
8,860.1
5,781.3
178.4
356,504.8

American Indian Economic Development Working Paper, 2003.
41
Testimony of Dr. Gavin Clarkson before the Senate Finance Committee, May 23, 2006.
42
See Thomson Financial data extract on file with author. For 2002, 2003, and 2004, state and
local governments issued 14,056, 14,752, and 13,306 tax-exempt short and long-term bonds
respectively. Id.; See also BOND BUYER ONLINE ARCHIVES, ANNUAL MUNICIPAL DEBT SALES, LONG
TERM BONDS, NUMBER OF ISSUES and ANNUAL MUNICIPAL DEBT SALES, SHORT TERM BONDS,
NUMBER OF ISSUES, available at, http://www.bondbuyer.com/msa_displayquickreport.html (last
viewed 12/12/2005), stating that for 2002, 2003, and 2004, state and local governments issued
12,517, 13,251, and 11,993 tax-exempt long term bonds respectively and for 2002, 2003, an 2004,
state and local governments issued 3,435, 3,300, and 3,172 tax-exempt short term bonds respectively.
43
See Thomson Financial data extract. For 2002, 2003, and 2004, tribal governments issued 4, 6,
and 5 tax-exempt short and long-term bonds respectively. Id.; See also BOND BUYER ONLINE
ARCHIVES, LONG TERM BONDS, supra, note ; BOND BUYER ONLINE ARCHIVES, SHORT TERM BONDS,
supra, note . For the years 2002, 2003, and 2004, tribal governments issued 6, 9, and 5 long term
bonds respectively. For the years 2002, 2003, and 2004, tribal governments issued 0, 0, and 1 short
term bonds respectively. (These Bond Buyer tribal bond statistics likely include some taxable bonds
and therefore the Thomson figures provide a more accurate picture of tribal tax-exempt debt
issuances).
44
Id. For 2002, 2003, and 2004, state and local governments issued $355.5 trillion, $378.9
trillion, and $356.5 trillion dollars of tax-exempt debt respectively. Id.
45
Id. For 2002, 2003, and 2004, tribal governments issued $194.4 million, $233.3 million, and
$178.4 million dollars of tax-exempt debt respectively. Id.
46
There are 565 federally recognized Indian Tribes and Alaskan Native Villages that could
potentially issue municipal debt, as compared to 3,141 counties, _____ cities, and 50 states. If ___
percent of all municipal issuers issue bonds each year, then the expected number of tribal issuers is
___, well short of the average of 5 per year.
47
Clarkson testimony, supra note 41.
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Although many municipal bonds fund infrastructure projects, a significant
number fund projects related to tourism and economic development. Tourism is a
major economic force for many municipalities and is vital to the economic
prospects of several communities. As an example, post-Katrina New Orleans is
almost wholly dependent on a rebound in tourism for its long-term economic
viability. Tourism and tourism-related economic development can include hotels,
golf resorts, convention centers, and even racetracks and casinos. In particular, the
IRS has acknowledged that several thousand municipal golf courses have been
financed with tax-exempt debt,48 and non-tribal governments have used billions of
tax-exempt bonds to build hotels and convention centers.49 The IRS has even
issued recent rulings to permit tax-exempt financing for new baseball stadiums for
the New York Yankees and the New York Mets, citing an earlier Revenue Ruling
which held that the promotion of tourism was an “exclusively public purpose.” 50
Nevertheless, tourism and tourism-related economic development cannot be
financed by tribes with tax-exempt debt.
Repurchasing ancestral homeland is another potential use for tax-exempt
bonds, yet statutory restrictions and the extreme interpretation by the IRS have
resulted in some highly unfortunate outcomes. In one instance, a tribe was
interested in repurchasing some ancestral homeland adjacent to land that it already
owned.51 Unfortunately, the land in question was farmland with an existing crop of
corn nearing maturity. The tribe wanted to issue tax-exempt bonds to purchase the
land but was advised that if they harvested the corn, the tax-exempt status of their
bonds could be jeopardized. The tribe was forced to let the corn rot in order to
preserve the tax-exempt status of the bonds.
In another case, a tribe had the opportunity to repurchase 23,000 acres of
ancestral homeland for approximately $5.5 million.52 Most of the land in question
had been over forested, but a small section containing harvestable timber remained
that would help the tribe afford the land purchase. Again, the restrictions in the Tax
Code meant that the tribe would not be able to harvest timber on the land, and they
could barely afford the interest payments even at tax-exempt rates. The author,
along with another colleague were fortunately able to develop a structure that
allowed the tribe to afford the necessary debt service, and the tribe was able to
purchase the land.
The IRS’s restrictive interpretation of tribal tax-exempt bonding authority has
also meant a substantially higher audit risk for tribal bonds, as tribal governments
are also victims of a demonstrably disproportionate number of IRS enforcement
actions. Less than 1% of the tax-exempt municipal offerings are audited by the IRS
48

Cite to IRS FSA
See Part III.C.2. infra.
50
See IRS PLR 110172-06 and 107899-06. These private letter rulings concluded that the public
purpose requirement is satisfied in part by the promotion of tourism, citing Rev. Rul. 72-194, which
held the promotion of tourism to be an “exclusively public purpose.” These rulings are wholly
inconsistent with the position the IRS has been taking with respect to the operation of tribal golf
courses and hotels, which the IRS argues are not essential governmental functions.
51
Interview with Robert Burpo of First American Financial Advisors on March 9, 2005.
52
See Offering Memorandum for Bad River Band of Lake Superior Chippewa, on file with the
author.
49
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each year, but direct tribal tax-exempt issuances are 30 times more likely to be
audited within four years of issue,53 and 100% of tribal conduit issuances have
been or are currently being challenged by the IRS.54 In all of these cases, the tribes
financed activities that had previously been financed by state and local
governments without any challenge from the IRS. While the National Congress of
American Indians and the National Intertribal Tax Alliance have worked to remove
these inequities for years,55 even the venerable Wall Street firm of Merrill Lynch is
on record decrying the inequity of the tax treatment of tribes relative to
municipalities.56 This high rate of tribal audits becomes even more questionable
when one realizes that tribal tax-exempt issuances make up only 0.1% of the taxexempt bond market.57
One of the more egregious examples of hostile and adverse treatment of a tribe
is the case of the Las Vegas Paiute Tribe. The tribe was not in a position to
compete in the gaming market, but they did have sufficient land thirty miles north
of Las Vegas to develop a golf course. The Paiutes used proceeds from a tax-free
bond issuance to finance construction of a public golf course with a clubhouse, a
retail store that sells golf-related items, and a restaurant, all of which were open to
the general public.58 The tribe had good reason to believe that construction of a
public golf course would qualify as an essential governmental function
“customarily performed by state and local governments,”59 given that “as of 1998
there were 2,645 publicly owned, municipal golf courses in the United States.”60
In August of 2002, however, the IRS advised the Las Vegas Paiutes that
construction of a public golf course is “other than an essential governmental
function within the meaning of § 7871(e).”61 Although the IRS acknowledged that
“it is likely that construction and operation of golf courses are customary
governmental functions,” it nonetheless decided to deny the tax-exemption based
on its reading of the customary use definition provided by the 1987 amendment.
The argument set forth by the IRS was that the golf course was not “intended
to meet the recreational needs of [the] Tribe.”62 Although other public golf courses
can be considered essential governmental functions, the IRS took the position that
Indian tribes cannot utilize tax-free debt to construct golf courses and
accompanying club houses because, in its opinion, the course was not of the type
that would be used by tribal golfers. The Field Service Advice Memorandum
(“FSA”) admits that all publicly built and operated golf courses “are developed to
enhance the lifestyle of both golfing and non-golfing citizens of the community
53

IRS Research Summary
See Alison L. McConnell, IRS' Anderson Says Attorneys At Fault for Tribal Bond Confusion,
BOND BUYER, September 22, 2005; see discussion of IRS enforcement at Part IV.E infra.
55
NCAI and NITA citations
56
See e.g. Merrill Lynch Municipal Credit Research, “Indian Gaming Bond Pricing Update,”
May 24, 2004 (tribes are forced to contend with “inequities in the Tax Code”)
57
See discussion of IRS enforcement at Part IV.E infra.
58
IRS Field Service Advice Memorandum No: 20024712 (date of release Nov. 22, 2002)
[hereinafter FSA].
59
I.R.C. § 7871(e)
60
FSA at 2.
61
FSA at 1.
62
FSA at 5.
54
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and perhaps to create jobs,”63 and in-house counsel recommended not litigating the
bond exemption because it would “be difficult to argue that Golf Course is so
commercial in nature that state and local governments would not own and operate
similar enterprises.”64 Additionally, the FSA acknowledged that “some courts,
including the Tenth Circuit, have adopted the principle that federal statutes are to
be construed liberally in favor of Native Americans, with ambiguous provisions
interpreted to their benefit.”65 In short, the IRS’ position was untenable based on
existing public practices and judicial rulings, but it denied the tax-exemption
anyway.
In a sharp contrast to its approach in the 2002 FSA to defining an essential
governmental function as excluding any commercial activity, the IRS has reasoned
that a state investment fund for cash balances constituted an essential
governmental function because “it may be assumed that Congress did not desire in
any way to restrict a state’s participation in enterprises that might be useful in
carrying out those projects desirable from the standpoint of the state government
which, on a broad consideration of the question, may be the function of the
sovereign to conduct.”66 Thus, for purposes of section 115, the IRS has, without
intervention by Congress, defined as an essential governmental function any
activity that makes or saves the government money. This definition encompasses
the very purpose of the Las Vegas Paiute Golf Course which the IRS has reasoned
does not qualify as an essential governmental function.67
The Las Vegas Paiute case is merely one example of the overt hostility
towards tribal governments from both the Tax Code and the IRS enforcement
regime. This article argues that, when compared to the treatment of other
governmental entities, such differential treatment can appropriately be
characterized as Tax Code Racism.
Of course, referring to a practice of adverse and differential treatment as
racism is not a charge to be levied lightly because an accusation of racism is one of
the most incendiary charges that can be leveled in our society. To do so armed with
empirical evidence, however, falls directly in line with Professor Robert Williams’
strategy of “direct confrontation that challenges the continuing use of racial
stereotypes [and imagery] in thinking and talking about Indian rights by the Court
[and] the U.S. Congress.”68 As Williams notes, the use of such empirical evidence
was also a strong component of the successful strategy employed in Brown v.
Board of Education.69 One challenge in discussing racism, however, is that the
precise meaning of “racism” is often not agreed upon.70 In order to clarify the
63

Id.
Id.
65
Id.
66
See John F. Theberge and Diana A. Imholtz, Tax-Exempt Financings Involving Indian Tribal
Governments, The Tax Exempt Organization Tax Review 182, August 2003 (quoting Rev. Rul. 77261).
67
FSA at 5.
68
Robert A. Williams, LIKE A LOADED WEAPON: THE REHNQUIST COURT, INDIAN RIGHTS, AND
THE LEGAL HISTORY OF RACISM IN AMERICA (2005) (herinafter LOADED WEAPON), p. xxviii.
69
Id at xxxii, n58.
70
See K. Anthony Appiah, forward to Albert Memmi RACISM (2000), p. ix (“careful attempts at
64
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charge, this article will use an objective definition of racism based on the writings
of Albert Memmi.71 Various scholars have attempted to define racism, but many of
these attempts have been cast in terms of black-white interactions.72 When dealing
with issues involving Indian tribes, entities with both racially and politically
defining characteristics, Memmi’s typology of racism provides a framework for
defining racism that has significant utility in examining the actions and perceptions
of dominant society relative to Indian tribes.73
Memmi was a Tunisian Jew whose perception of racism was heavily
influenced both by his membership in a group that had a long history of being
subjected to European racism and imperialism as well as his experience of being a
Jew in a predominantly Arab country. Memmi also personally suffered under the
power of European colonialism and racism, particularly when he was imprisoned
in a Nazi work camp during World War II. Based on these and other experiences,
Memmi proposed the following definition of racism:
the generalizing definition and valuation of differences, whether real or
imaginary, to the advantage of the one defining and deploying them [accuser],
and to the detriment of the one subjected to the act of definition [victim],
whose purpose is to justify (social or physical) hostility and assault
[aggression].74

His analysis also discusses four essential “moments” of racism:
1.
2.
3.
4.

An insistence on difference, whether real or imaginary. The perceived
difference can be somatic, cultural, religious, etc.; the emphasis is on the
discernment of its existence, rather than its nature or content.
The imposition of a negative valuation upon those seen as differing, implying
(by the act of imposition) a positive valuation for those imposing it.
This differential valuation rendering the difference unignorable is made
absolute by generalizing to an entire group that is then deprecated in turn.
The negative valuation imposed upon that group becomes the legitimization
and justification for present or possible hostility, aggression, or privilege.75

The power of Memmi’s typology of racism lies in the fact that his definition
does not require that the perceived differences be only biological in nature, as (real
or imaginary) cultural differences could just as easily be used to justify aggression
or privilege as could biological differences. Such has been the case with Indian
tribes, as many of the policies directed towards them were based on a hostile

a definition [of racism] are surprisingly rare”).
71
See e.g. Albert Memmi RACISM (2000).
72
See e.g. Jody David Armour, NEGROPHOBIA AND REASONABLE RACISM: THE HIDDEN COST OF
BEING BLACK IN AMERICA (1997); Joel Kovel, WHITE RACISM: A PSYCHOHISTORY, __ (1970).
73
See generally Williams, LOADED WEAPON, supra note 68; Robert A. Williams, Documents of
Barbarism: The Contemporary Legacy of European Racism and Colonialism in The Narrative
Traditions of Federal Indian Law, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 237 (1989)
74
Memmi, RACISM, supra note ___ at 100. Memmi’s original definition, presented in Memmi,
Attempt at a Definition, in DOMINATED MAN: NOTES TOWARD A PORTRAIT (1968) at 185, was quite
similar: “the generalized and final assigning of values to real or imaginary differences, to the
accuser’s benefit and at his victim’s expense, in order to justify the former’s own privileges or
aggression.”
75
Memmi, RACISM, supra note ___ at xvii-xviii.
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perception of tribalism76 while others were based on negative perceptions of
biological differences.77
Noted postcolonial theorist Homi Bhaba posits a similar notion of “colonial
discourse,” suggesting that its use “as an apparatus of power, at a minimum, turns
on the recognition and disavowal of racial/cultural/historical differences”78 and that
the “objective of colonial discourse is to construe the colonized as a population of
degenerate types on the basis of racial origin, in order to justify conquest and to
establish systems of administration and instruction.”79
Given the broad authority that the federal government has in managing Indian
affairs, laws and policies based on racist notions are particularly deleterious when
considering that dominant society’s perception of Indian tribes has often been
racist in nature. Part I of this article discusses the nature of Indian tribes and their
relationship to the federal government and makes the argument that while the
United States is usually forced to deal with tribes on a government-to-government
basis, racist attitudes fundamentally shape the nature of those interactions despite
the inherent recognition of tribal sovereignty. While the charge of racism is levied
against the Tax Code and its concomitant regulations, the tribes feel the impact of
the alleged racism when they approach capital markets in competition with other
governmental entities.
For those readers unfamiliar with public finance, Part II of this article
introduces governmental access to the capital markets, including a discussion of
the policy justifications for tax-free treatment of municipal debt. This section also
identifies those elements of the public finance market that are either unavailable to
tribes or are only available under restrictive conditions that apply to tribes but do
not restrict other governmental entities. Although the last quarter century has seen
many racist policies and laws replaced by a formal federal policy of tribal selfdetermination, the specter of racism still lurks in the shadows, occasionally rearing
its ugly head. As mentioned earlier, one such instance that provides the basis for
this article’s charge of Tax Code racism is the political and regulatory
maneuvering during and after the passage of the Tribal Tax Status Act. Part III
examines the legislative and regulatory history of this Act and its subsequent
enforcement, providing detailed empirical evidence of demonstrably
discriminatory treatment of tribal tax-exempt bonds. Having reviewed in detail the
legislative history of the status quo as well as differential treatment of tribes and
states in IRS audit and enforcement, the article continues in Part IV by applying
Memmi’s typology of racism in examining the adverse impact of the Act.
Although there is legitimate concern that leveling the charge of racism might cause
some to dismiss the underlying merits of the arguments presented in this article,
Williams correctly notes that “Indian rights will never be justly protected by any
legal system or civil society that continues to talk about Indians as if they are

76

See Part III infra.
Id.
78
Homi K. Bhaba, The Other Question: Stereotype, Discrimination, and the Discourse of
Colonialism, in THE LOCATION OF CULTURE (1994), p. 70.
79
Id.
77
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uncivilized, unsophisticated, and lawless savages.”80 Merely substantiating the
charge of racism is insufficient, however, so this article concludes by proposing
specific statutory modifications that would eliminate the discriminatory elements
in the Tax Code.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF TRIBAL LAW AND POLICY
The racist notions that led to the restrictions of tribal economic development
are not new, as the discourse of racism against Indian tribes traces back to the
origins of the United States itself.81 In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 82 the first
Supreme Court opinion involving an American Indian tribe,83 Chief Justice
Marshall wrote that “the relation of the Indians to the United States is marked by
peculiar and cardinal distinctions which exist no where else.”84 A half century later
the Supreme Court would opine that the “relation of the Indian tribes living within
the borders of the United States, both before and since the Revolution, to the
people of the United States has always been an anomalous one and of a complex
character.”85 Even today, Supreme Court justices find that “Federal Indian policy
is, to say the least, schizophrenic. And this confusion continues to infuse federal
Indian law and our cases.”86 The concept that so confounds both Congress and the
courts is that, on one hand, Indian tribes are separate sovereigns, “domestic
dependent nations”87 that are ensconced as a “third sovereign”88 in the federal
framework. On the other hand, Congress has plenary authority over Indian tribes.89
While the fabrication of this plenary authority has dubious origins,90 the continued
80

See Williams, LOADED WEAPON, supra note 68, p. xxviii. In comparing the struggle for Indian
rights with the successful strategies employed by Thurgood Marshall in arguing Brown v. Board of
Education, Williams argues that “the legal history of racism in American teaches us that the most
successful minority rights advocates of the twentieth century recognized that the real waste of time
was trying to get a nineteenth-century racist legal doctrine to do a better job of protecting minority
rights.” Id. at xxxii.
81
Id., p. xxv.
82
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831).
83
An earlier Supreme Court case, Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 US 543 (1823), dealt with the issue
of who could acquire title to land from Indian tribes, but no tribe was a party to the case.
84
Cherokee Nation at 14.
85
United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381 (1886).
86
United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 219 (2004).
87
Cherokee Nation at 14.
88
In the words of Justice O’Connor, “Today, in the United States, we have three types of
sovereign entities – The Federal government, the states, and the Indian tribes. Each of these
sovereigns … plays an important role … in this country.” O’Connor, Lessons from the Third
Sovereign: Indian Tribal Courts, 33 Tulsa L.J. 1, 1997.
89
Handbook III § 1.03[1]
90
Arguably, the Supreme Court simply made up the notion of plenary authority. In Kagama, the
Court stated that
These Indian tribes are the wards of the nation. They are communities dependent on the
United States. Dependent largely for their daily food. Dependent for their political rights
. . . . From their very weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of
the Federal Government with them and the treaties in which it has been promised, there
arises the duty of protection, and with it the power. This has always been recognized by the
Executive, and by Congress, and by this court, whenever the question has arisen.
Id. at 383–384. Unable to find a source for such plenary authority in the Consitution, the Court
held that
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maintenance of such authority is justified by a racist discourse based on a negative
perception of tribalism.91
The acknowledged existence of tribal sovereignty, however, has served to
impede the deleterious exercise of that plenary authority. While each tribe has its
own separate history, the struggle to maintain a separate sovereign existence is
common to most tribes. The economic importance of that struggle cannot be
overstated, particularly in the modern context, as the “first key to economic
development is sovereignty.”92 It is important to review the origins of the federal
Indian law and policy before addressing the modern context.
The schizophrenic dichotomy inherent in the notion of domestic dependent
nations has been a part of the history of North America from the moment that
Europeans first made contact with the Indians, in part because multiple competing
sovereigns asserted claims in North America. Although the doctrines of conquest
had their origins in legal theories developed to justify the Crusades,93 when
competing European nations began to expand their empires, the papacy began to
grant exclusive rights to lands as they were “discovered,” including rights of
sovereignty over the indigenous populations.94
The power of the General Government over these remnants of a race once powerful, now
weak and diminished in numbers, is necessary to their protection, as well as to the safety of
those among whom they dwell. It must exist in that government, because it never has
existed anywhere else, because the theatre of its exercise is within the geographical limits of
the United States, because it has never been denied, and because it alone can enforce its
laws on all the tribes.
Id. at 384–385.
91
See, e.g., Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 590 (1823) (“But the tribes of Indians inhabiting this
country were fierce savages, whose occupation was war, and whose subsistence was drawn chiefly
from the forest. To leave them in possession of their country, was to leave the country a wilderness
. . .”); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831) (“[Indians] are in a state of pupilage. Their
relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian.”); Worcester v. Georgia, 31
U.S. 515, 588 (1832) (discussing the “humane policy of the government towards these children of the
wilderness must afford pleasure to every benevolent feeling”). These three cases, often referred to as
the “Marshall Trilogy,” form much of the foundation for federal Indian law.
92
Steven Cornell, Sovereignty, Prosperity and Policy in Indian Country Today, 5 COMMUNITY
REINVESTMENT 5, 5 (1997).
93
See e.g. Pope Innocent IV, Commentaria Doctissima in Quinque Libros Decretalium, in THE
EXPANSION OF EUROPE: THE FIRST PHASE 191-192 (James Muldoon ed. 1977), (“[I]s it licit to invade
a land that infidels possess or which belong to them? … [I]t is licit for the pope to [demand
allegiance, and] if the infidels do not obey, they ought to be compelled by the secular arm and war
may be declared against them by the pope and not by anyone else.”) See also Robert A. Williams,
THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT: THE DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST (1992), at
_____.
94
See e.g. “Bull ‘Inter caetera Divinae’ of Pope Alexander VI dividing the New Continents and
granting America to Spain, May 4, 1493” in CHURCH AND STATE THROUGH THE CENTURIES 153-57
(Sidney Z. Ehler & John B. Morrall, trans. And eds. 1967)
Wherefore, all things considered maturely and, as it becomes Catholic kings and prices …
you have decided to subdue the said mainlands and islands, and their natives and
inhabitants, … [w]ith the proviso, however, that these mainlands and islands found or to be
found, discovered or to be discovered … be not actually possessed by some other Christian
king or prince.
See also “Romanus Pontifex,” the papal bull of Pope Nicholas V (1454) (granting Portugal the
exclusive right to colonize the Canary Islands and all other parts of Africa) in CHURCH AND STATE
THROUGH THE CENTURIES 153-57; Williams supra note 93 at _____. See also generally Felix S.
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Even after England broke away from the authority of Rome, English law still
supported this “Doctrine of Discovery,”95 although the validity of the doctrine was
a subject of debate among early colonial settlers.96 Irrespective of conflicting
religious interpretations of Indian rights, practical realities shaped legal relations
between the Indians and colonists.97 The necessity of getting along with powerful
and militarily capable Indian tribes98 dictated that the settlers seek Indian consent
to settle if they wished to live in peace and safety, buying lands that the Indians
were willing to sell rather than displacing them by other methods. As a result, the
English colonial governments acquired most of the lands by purchase from the
Indians.99 For all practical purposes, during this period “the Indians were treated as
sovereigns possessing full ownership rights to the lands of America.”100
At the outbreak of the French and Indian War in 1754, treaty making assumed
a new dimension, as each of the competing European powers sought to form
alliances with the various tribes. The military importance of treaty alliances would
continue throughout the Revolutionary War period as well. After the war, however,
a powerful group of tribes that had sided with the British during the war confronted
the founding fathers. Those tribes still maintained claims to the territory between
the Appalachian Mountains and the Mississippi River. George Washington
detailed his proposed policy for dealing with the Indians in a letter to James
Duane, the head of the Committee of Indian Affairs of the Continental Congress.
Cohen, The Spanish Origin of Indian Rights in the Law of the United States, 31 Geo. L. J. 1 (1942).
95
See e.g. Calvin’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 1378 (K.B. 1608)
All infidels are in law perpetui inimici, perpetual enemies (for the law presumes not that
they will be converted, that being remota potentia, a remote possibility) for between them,
as with the devils, whose subjects they be, and the Christian, there is perpetual hostility, and
can be no peace; … And upon this ground there is a diversity between a conquest of a
kingdom of a Christian King, and the conquest of a kingdom of an infidel; for if a King
come to a Christian kingdom by conquest, … he may at his pleasure alter and change the
laws of that kingdom: but until he doth make an alteration of those laws the ancient laws of
that kingdom remain. But if a Christian King should conquer a kingdom of an infidel, and
bring them under his subjection, there ipso facto the laws of the infidel are abrogated, for
that they be not only against Christianity, but against the law of God and of nature,
contained in the decalogue; and in that case, until certain laws be established amongst them,
the King by himself, and such Judges as he shall appoint, shall judge them and their causes
according to natural equity.
This opinion was authored by Lord Chief Justice Edward Coke who, coincidentally, wrote the
charter for the Virginia Company in 1606. See Williams supra note 93 at _____.
96
Compare the arguments of John Winthrop (as “for the Natives in New England they inclose
noe land neither have any settled habitation nor any tame cattle to improve the land by, & soe have
noe other but a naturall right to those countries.”) with those of Roger Williams (“I have knowne
them make bargaine and sale amongst themselves for a small piece, or quantity of Ground [and this
they do] notwithstanding a sinfull opinion amongst many the Christians have right to Heathens
Lands.”) recounted in Cheister E. Eisinger, THE PURITAN’S JUSTIFICATION FOR TAKING THE LAND, 84
Essex Institute Historical Collections 135-143 (1948).
97
See HANDBOOK II, p. 55.
98
Id. Despite devastating outbreaks of disease, the Indians would continue to outnumber the
European settlers for several decades.
99
Id. The Dutch similarly opted to obtain land via consented purchase rather than more bellicose
methods.
100
Id.
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[P]olicy and [economy] point very strongly to the expediency of being upon
good terms with the Indians, and the propriety of purchasing their Lands in
preference to attempting to drive them by force of arms out of their Country;
which as we have already experienced is like driving the Wild Beast of the
Forest which will return as soon as the pursuit is at an end and fall perhaps on
those that are left there; when the gradual extension of our Settlements will as
certainly cause the Savage as the Wolf to retire; both being beasts of prey tho'
they differ in shape. In a word there is nothing to be obtained by an Indian
War but the Soil they live on and this can be had by purchase at less expense
[sic], and without that bloodshed, and those distresses which helpless Women
and Children are made partakers of in all kinds of disputes with them.101

Although Washington’s letter has been called the founding document of
American Indian policy,102 its clearly racist notions sit alongside the pragmatic
necessity of treating with the Indians. As the newly formed United States began its
inexorable march westward, the Indian lands usually were not taken by force but
were instead ceded by treaty in return for, among other things, the establishment of
a trust relationship,103 often in specific consideration for the Indians’
relinquishment of land.104 It is important to note that these treaties were always
entered into as government-to-government relationships between the tribes as
collective political entities and the United States.105 From the beginning of its
political existence, therefore, the United States “recognized a measure of autonomy
in the Indian bands and tribes. Treaties rested upon a concept of Indian sovereignty
. . . and in turn greatly contributed to that concept.”106
Treating tribes as governments was clearly more a function of pragmatism than
a generally held belief that tribal governments were legitimate sovereigns, and
although the Indian tribes regarded treaty obligations as sacred, racist notions of
the inferiority of tribalism prompted many to question whether their provisions
were binding on the United States. As Williams notes, the legal discourse of
101

Letter from George Washington to James Duane (Sept. 7, 1783), in Francis Prucha,
Documents of United States Indian Policy 1-2 (2000).
102
See e.g., Williams, LOADED WEAPON, supra note 68, p. 44.
103
The scope of the trust relationship is multi-faceted. “Many treaties explicitly provided for
protection by the United States.” HANDBOOK II, supra note 7, at 65 n.38. See, e.g., Treaty with the
Creeks, Aug. 7, 1790, art. 2, 7 Stat. 35, reprinted in Kappler, supra note 113, at 25 [hereinafter
“Treaty with the Creeks”]; Treaty with the Kaskaskia, Aug. 13, 1803, art. 2, 7 Stat. 78, reprinted in
Kappler, supra note 113, at 67 [hereinafter “Treaty with the Kaskaskia”].
Other treaties provided the means for subsistence. See, e.g., Fort Laramie Treaty, supra note 113
(providing for subsistence rations for the Sioux.); 1828 Treaty with the Western Cherokees, Art. 8, 7
Stat. at 313, reprinted in Kappler, supra note 113, at 290 [hereinafter “Treaty with the Western
Cherokees”]; HANDBOOK II, supra note 7, at 81 (“[E]ach Head of a Cherokee family . . . who may
desire to remove West, shall be given, on enrolling himself for emigration, a good Rifle, a Blanket,
and a Kettle, and five pounds of Tobacco: (and to each member of his family one Blanket,) . . . a just
compensation for the property he may abandon.”).
104
See, e.g., Treaty with the Creeks, supra note 103; Treaty with the Kaskaskia, supra note 103;
Treaty with the Western Cherokees, supra note 103; Fort Laramie Treaty, supra note 113.
105
See, e.g., Treaty with the Six Nations of October 22, 1784, reprinted in Prucha supra note
113, at 4; Treaty of Fort McIntosh of January 21, 1785, reprinted in Prucha supra note 113, at 5; Fort
Laramie Treaty of September 17, 1851, reprinted in Prucha supra note 113, at 84 (referring to the
United States and the Sioux collectively as “the aforesaid nations”).
106
Francis Paul Prucha, American Indian Treaties: The History of a Political Anomaly 2 (1994).
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opposition to tribal sovereignty argued that tribal Indians, “by virtue of their
radical divergence from the norms and values of white society regarding use and
entitlement to lands, could make no claims to possession or sovereignty over
territories which they had not cultivated and which whites coveted.”107 Various
political factions disagreed over whether tribalism could survive contact with white
civilization and whether the appropriate course of action was to make the Indians
assimilate into that society or to remove them beyond the reaches of that society.108
Ultimately, racist notions of tribal inferiority prevailed, and Congress passed the
1830 Removal Act.109 Several tribes in the Southeast, however, already had treaties
that secured their right to remain on their ancestral homeland. In response, Georgia
Governor George Gilmer declared that
treaties were expedients by which ignorant, intractable, and savage people
were induced without bloodshed to yield up what civilized peoples had a right
to possess by virtue of that command of the Creator delivered to man upon
his formation – be fruitful, multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it.110

The practice of purchasing land from the Indians was merely “the substitute by
which humanity and expediency have imposed, in place of the sword, in arriving at
the actual enjoyment of property claimed by the right of discovery, and sanctioned
by the natural superiority allowed to the claims of civilized communities over
those of savage tribes.”111 Williams clearly demonstrates the racism inherent in the
legal discourse of the Removal Period.112 Despite these racist notions, however, the
process of removal itself was accomplished through a series of treaties. Over the
next forty years, tribal sovereignty was inherently recognized as tribes agreed to
either remove to the west of the Mississippi or cede portions of their ancestral
homeland in the face of advancing settlement.113
107

Williams, supra note 73, 243-244. Such arguments were made by several prominent
individuals, including President John Quincy Adams.

The Indian right of possession itself stands, with regard to the greater part of the
country, upon a questionable foundation. … [W]hat is the right of a huntsman to the forest
of a thousand miles over which he has accidentally ranged in quest of prey? Shall the
liberal bounties of Providence to the race of man be monopolized by one of ten thousand
for whom they were created? Shall the exuberant bosom of the common mother, amply
adequate to the nourishment of millions, be claimed exclusively by a few hundreds of her
offspring? Shall the lordly savage not only disdain the virtues and enjoyments of
civilization himself, but shall he control the civilization of a world?
No, generous philanthropists! Heaven has not been thus inconsistent in the works of its
hands. Heaven has not thus placed at irreconcilable strife its moral laws with its physical
creation.
Oration at Plymouth delivered at Plymouth Mass. December 22, 1802.
108

See letter from President Jefferson to William Henry Harrison (Feb. 27, 1803) in Prucha,
supra note ___, ___ (“[O]ur settlements will gradually circumscribe and approach the Indians, and
they will in time either incorporate with us as citizens of the United States, or remove beyond the
Mississippi”).
109
Removal Act, ch. 148, 4 Stat. 411 (1830) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 174 (1982).
110
Quoted in PRUCHA, GREAT FATHER 196.
111
Id.
112
Williams, Documents of Barbarism, supra note 73, at 239-58.
113
See e.g. Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek, Sept. 1830, reprinted in 2 Charles J. Kappler,
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While the formal existence of the United States began at a point in time when
the prevailing policy recognized tribal sovereignty through the treaty-making
process, such an orientation was not permanent. In the 1870s Congress ceased
making treaties with the Indians114 and instead developed a policy of allotting
tribal lands to individual Indians115 that was characterized as a “mighty pulverizing
engine”116 that would destroy tribalism and force Indians to assimilate into
dominant society as individuals.117 Racist notions of the inferiority of tribalism
were again a catalyst for policy change, but implementation of the policy required
recognition of tribal sovereignty. Realization of the Allotment Act required
negotiations with tribal governments, and even when eviscerating the governance
structure of particular tribes, such as the Five Civilized Tribes in Oklahoma,
Congress still “continued [the existence of tribes and tribal governments] in full
force and effect for all purposes authorized by law.”118
If the policy objective of the Allotment Act was to improve the lives of the
Indians, it was a colossal failure.119 Russell Lawrence Barsh and James
Youngblood Henderson describe the period between Kagama and the Indian
Reorganization Act of 1934 as one of plenary federal control, with
Indian Affairs, Laws and Treaties 310 (1904) (signed by Choctaw leaders at bok chukfi ahithac—
“the little creek where the rabbits dance”—providing for the removal from the ancestral homelands in
Mississippi and Alabama to land in southeastern Oklahoma); Fort Laramie Treaty, April 29, 1868, 15
Stat. 635, reprinted in Prucha, supra note 101, 109 (signed by the Sioux Nation at the conclusion of
the Powder River War, establishing a reservation) [hereinafter “Fort Laramie Treaty”].
114
Treaty making with the Indians was ended by Congress in 1871: “[H]ereafter no Indian
nation or tribe within the territory of the United States shall be acknowledged or recognized as an
independent, nation, or power with whom the United States may contract by treaty . . . .” Abolition of
Treaty Making, 16 Stat. 544, 566 (1871), reprinted in Prucha, supra note 113, at 135.
115
General Allotment Act of 1887, 24 Stat. 388 (1887). The statute is also known as the Dawes
Act after Senator Henry L. Dawes of Massachusetts. While the Dawes Act represented the final, fullscale realization of the allotment policy, many treaties made with western tribes from 1865 to 1868
provided for allotment in severalty of tribal lands. See Robert Winston Mardock, The Reformers and
the American Indians 212 (1971).
116
In an address to Congress in 1901, President Theodore Roosevelt expressed his sense of the
assimilation policy:
[T]he time has arrived when we should definitely make up our minds to recognize the
Indian as an individual and not as a member of a tribe. The General Allotment Act is a
mighty pulverizing engine to break up the tribal mass [acting] directly upon the family and
the individual . . . .
117
See Gavin Clarkson, Not Because They are Brown, but Because of Ea: Why the Good Guys
Lost in Rice v. Cayetano, and Why They Didn’t Have to Lose, 7 Mich J. Race & L. 318, 327 (2002)
118

Five Tribes Act, Act of April 26, 1906, ch. 1876, 34 Stat. 137.

That the tribal existence and present tribal governments of the Choctaw, Chickasaw,
Cherokee, Creek and Seminole tribes or nations are hereby continued in full force and effect
for all purposes authorized by law, until otherwise provided by law, but the tribal council or
legislature in any of said tribes or nations shall not be in session for a longer period than
thirty days in any one year: Provided, That no act, ordinance, or resolution (except
resolutions for adjournment) of the tribal council or legislature of any of the said tribes or
nations shall be of any validity until approved by the President of the United States:
Provided further, That no contract involving the payment or expenditure of any money or
affecting any property belonging to any of said tribes or nations made by them or any of
them or by any officer thereof, shall be of any validity until approved by the President of the
United States.
119
Cite to Collier 1934 report.
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tribes wholly subject to Congress and the president, acting through the
Bureau of Indian Affairs. No local laws or assemblies were recognized, and a
special police force was established to maintain federal supremacy.
Traditional leadership was deposed, prosecuted, and sometimes killed when
in conflict with federal agent policy. 120

By the 1930s it was clear that the United States needed to change its stance on
tribal sovereignty again,121 and Congress passed the Indian Reorganization Act of
1934 (IRA).122 In an effort to reinforce tribal sovereignty, the legislation allowed
tribes to adopt constitutions and to reestablish structures for governance. Post-IRA
federal treatment of the tribes was less restrictive, allowing for the popular election
of tribal leaders according to tribal laws and constitutions.123 Congressional policy
had completely reversed itself—tribal sovereignty was now to be encouraged
rather than destroyed.
Contemporaneously with the passage of the IRA, Congress also completed a
massive overhaul of the securities laws; however, those involved in crafting the
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 probably never
envisioned that tribal governments would ever be in the position to issue taxexempt debt. Although this oversight does not have an impact on the tax status of
tribal debt, the differential treatment of tribal securities relative to securities issued
by state and local governments adversely affects tribal debt.124
Federal Indian policy would oscillate through one more cycle in the next half
century before President Nixon issued a landmark statement calling for a new
federal policy of “self-determination” for Indian nations.125 Nineteen years after
the passage of the IRA, Congress again set about destroying the tribes.126 In 1953,
Congress passed Public Law 83-280, a law that has been described as “a
monument to congressional ambiguity and indecision.” 127 In Public Law 280,128
120

RUSSEL LAWRENCE BARSH AND JAMES YOUNGBLOOD HENDERIONS, THE ROAD: INDIAN TRIBES
AND POLITICAL LIBERTY 209 (1980).
121

See e.g. Institute for Govt. Research, Studies in Administration, The Problem of Indian
Administration (the “Merriam Report,” issued in 1928), documenting the failure of federal Indian
policy during the allotment period.
122
25 U.S.C. § 461 et seq. (1994).
123
Barsh & Henderson, supra note 120, at 209.
124
The lack of a securities registration exemption for tribal municipal bonds imposes a liquidity
premium. Preliminary research suggests that the premium ranges between 75 and 250 basis points
(0.75% to 2.5%) of additional interest that must be paid by the tribal issuer. See Gavin Clarkson,
Racism in the Capital Markets, University of Michigan Working Paper (2006). See also Clarkson
testimony, supra note 41.
125
Message from the President of the United States Transmitting Recommendations for Indian
Policy, H.R.Doc. No. 91-363, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. ( July 8, 1970). See also The Indian Financing Act
of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-262, 88 Stat. 77 (1974) (codified as 25 U.S.C. §§ 1451–1453). Perhaps the
greatest of Nixon’s contributions to Indian tribal sovereignty was Public Law 638, the Indian SelfDetermination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-638 (1994) (codified in 25
U.S.C. §§ 450a–450), which expressly authorized the Secretaries of Interior and Health and Human
Services to contract with and make grants to Indian tribes and other Indian organizations for the
delivery of federal services.
126
Barsh & Henderson, supra note 120, at 211.
127
Act of 15 August 1953, c. 505, 67 Stat. 588-90, originally codified as 18 U.S.C. 1162 and 28
U.S.C. 1360, as amended 25 U.S.C. 1321-22; Barsh & Henderson, supra note 120, at 127.
128
See P.L. 83-280, 6 Stat. 588 (1953), codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a): “Each of the States
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Congress, without tribal consent, extended state civil and criminal jurisdiction to
tribal lands in six states and authorized all other states to assume such jurisdiction
at their option.129 This act was followed swiftly thereafter with the passage of a
number of statutes liquidating individual tribes—“these acts distributed the tribes’
assets by analogy to corporate dissolution and afforded the states an opportunity to
modify, merge or abolish the tribe’s government functions.”130
Federal policy once again reversed itself, and the policy of Termination was
suspended in 1968 with President Nixon’s policy of “self-determination.”131 By
“self-determination,” President Nixon sought “to strengthen the Indian's sense of
autonomy without threatening his sense of community.”132 Self-determination led
to an increase in economic development activity, but access to capital remained an
impediment.133 President Reagan made his American Indian policy statement on
January 24, 1983, stating his support for “self determination.”134 In attempting to
give definition to “self-determination,” he stated:
Instead of fostering and encouraging self-government, federal policies have,
by and large, inhibited the political and economic development of the tribes.
Excessive regulation and self-perpetuating bureaucracy have stifled local
decision making, thwarted Indian control of Indian resources and promoted
dependency rather than self-sufficiency.135

In 1983, President Reagan established the Presidential Commission on Indian
Reservation Economies. In 1984 the Commission published its Report and
Recommendations again calling for a major shift in federal Indian policy.136 The
Commission promulgated recommendations in the following five categories:
Development Framework, Capital Formation, Business Development, Labor
Markets, and Development Incentives.137 Pertinent to the instant inquiry, under
Capital Formation, the Commission recommended private ownership or private
management of tribal enterprises; amending the Securities Act of 1933 to place
listed . . . shall have jurisdiction over civil causes of action between Indians or to which Indians are
parties which arise in the areas of Indian country listed . . . to the same extent that such State has
jurisdiction over other civil causes of action, and those civil laws of such State that are of general
application to private persons or private property shall have the same force and effect within such
Indian country as they have elsewhere within the state . . .” (emphasis added). The Supreme Court,
upon examining the legislative history of P.L. 280, found that the intent of Congress was to apply the
state rules of decision in Indian Country, not to confer total jurisdiction over Indian lands. See Bryan
v. Itasca County, supra note ___.
129
Barsh & Henderson, supra note 120, at 128. The six mandatory states were Alaska,
California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin. Id. at 128, n. 80.
130
Barsh & Henderson, supra note 120, at 132. Examples of this legislative activity include Act
of 13 August 1954, c. 732, 68 Stat. 718 (Klamath), Act of 3 August 1956, c. 909, 70 Stat. 963
(Ottawas).
131
Id.
132
Samuel R. Cook, What is Indian Self-Determination?, RED INK, May 1, 1994, available at
http://faculty.smu.edu/twalker/samrcook.htm.
133
See HANDBOOK III supra note 7, §21.03
134
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON INDIAN RESERVATION ECONOMIES, REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES Part I, 7 (1984).
135
Id.
136
Id.
137
Id, at 25.
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tribes on the same footing as state and local governments; amending the Tribal Tax
Status Act to provide tribes with the same tax exemptions as state and local
governments; establishing an Indian Venture Capital Fund; and amending the
Indian Loan Guaranty Fund and the Indian Finance Act to minimize the role of the
BIA and to encourage the private sector to invest in Indian country.138
Some scholars have criticized the IRA and the notions of evaluating tribal
corporations using westernized norms of corporate performance because such
evaluations often highlight perceived differences between economic development
in Indian Country and corporate America.139 According to the Memmi typology,
however, perceptions of difference that are not used to justify hostility are not
racist, and thus Williams may be incorrect in assuming that capitalist assessments
of tribal economies are inherently racist.140 Irrespective of whether one views
capitalism as good or bad, the reality is that tribal nations exist within a larger
capitalist system, and any assumption that tribes cannot adapt to that system runs
the risk of falling into the very discourse that Williams decries. Tribes have
adapted to their environments for millennia, and the arrival of Europeans did not
diminish that adaptiveness. Many tribes pride themselves on their ability to adapt:
the Navajos developed a thriving weaving industry using wool from sheep brought
over by Europeans; the Plains Indians incorporated European horses into their
culture; and the Choctaw claim that if the Europeans had brought aluminum foil
with them, Choctaws would have been cooking with it while the other tribes were
still regarding it with suspicion.141
The evidence from the last century of tribal economic development indicates
that tribes can and must compete within the larger capitalist environment, and
given a level playing field, they can thrive. If the competitive landscape is stacked
against tribes, however, those impediments can be appropriately characterized as
racist if they continue to exist with little or no legitimate purpose, given that they
suppress tribal economic development and curtail tribal access to capital.

138

Id. at 39-47.
See e.g. Williams, Documents of Barbarism, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. at 266-68. Williams takes issue
with the description of tribal structures contained in the PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON
INDIAN RESERVATION ECONOMIES, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES (1984).:
As illustrated by its derogatory nomenclature for describing tribal governments’s
differences (“social welfare driven”; “patronage system”; “dependent”), the Commission’s
discourse of tribal self-determination clearly devalues tribal enterprises operated by tribal
governments according to tribal values...The Commission’s point of reference for assigning
negative values to contemporary tribalism’s perceived self-determining vision of economic
development is of course the dominant society’s profit driven norms. Thus, if tribalism
further declines in response to the federal government’s failure to adequately fund its trust
responsibility to Indian people, tribalism’s own stubbornly held difference from the superior
values of the dominant society will be blamed.
Williams, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. at 267-68.
140
Id.
141
Gavin Clarkson, Reclaiming Jurisprudential Sovereignty: A Tribal Judiciary Analysis, 50 U.
KAN. L. REV 502 (2002)
139
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II. A BRIEF REVIEW OF PUBLIC FINANCE
A. The Nature of Municipal Debt
Depending on the source of funds used to repay the debt, municipal debt can
take a number of forms, generally under the umbrella of either general obligation
or revenue bonds.
A general obligation bond can be either secured or, more commonly,
unsecured and, in the latter case, the issuer will generally promise to repay
principal and interest from any of the issuer’s available funds. 142 In both secured
and unsecured general obligation bonds, the general credit of the issuer is
pledged.143
A revenue bond differs from a general obligation bond in that the debt
obligation is limited in terms of recourse to a specifically identified source of
revenue that is pledged to secure the debt.144 The general credit of the issuer is not
pledged—“[r]evenue bonds, in contrast [to general obligation bonds], pledge

only the earnings from revenue-producing activities, most often the
earnings from the facilities being financed.”145 A type of revenue bond
important to the instant inquiry is the Private Activity Bond (“PAB”). With a PAB,
a state or local government issues the bond for or on behalf of a private entity—
“[f]or example, a sewer district would issue PABs to build a sewage plant that will
then be privately managed.”146
B. Sources of Municipal Debt
Although bank debt and bond indentures both represent a promise to pay a
specific sum of money (principal amount) at a specified date or dates in the future
(maturity date) together with periodic interest at a specified rate, each type of debt
has unique attributes and establishes a relationship with a different set of lenders.
Additionally, given the same level of earnings, an issuer will likely be able to
borrow larger amounts for longer periods by issuing bonds rather than by
borrowing from a bank.
1. Bank Debt
Commercial banks typically lend money to governmental borrowers as part of
an ongoing business relationship. For larger amounts, a group of banks (often
called a syndicate) will collectively lend money to the borrower. A borrower can
usually borrow up to two times earnings from a bank or bank syndicate, and the
term of a bank loan (or note) is generally three to five and sometimes up to seven
years.
Bank debt can also be used as temporary financing when a borrower plans to
subsequently issue more debt through a bond offering to finance a larger project. A
142

See Fippinger supra note 20, § 1:2.2
Id. See also Gelfand § 2:05
144
See Fippinger § 1:2.3; Gelfand § 2:13; Recourse refers to the set of actions that the lender can
take to obtain payment. In this instance, the lender can only look to the revenues specifically pledged.
If those are insufficient, the lender cannot look to other assets of the issuer.
145
Ellen P. Aprill, Tribal Bonds: Indian Sovereignty and the Tax Legislative Process, 46 ADMIN.
L. REV. 333, 342 (1994).
146
Id.
143
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portion of the bond proceeds are then used to pay off the bank note.
2. Bond Indentures
Unlike bank debt that generally has a single lender holding the note, a bond
indenture is a negotiable instrument that can be bought and sold in the capital
markets. Thus the lenders, or bondholders, often have no direct relationship with
the issuer. While issuing a bond is typically a more complex transaction than
obtaining a bank loan, issuers can generally borrow larger amounts for longer
terms. An issuer can borrow as much as three to four times its revenues by issuing
bonds, and the payments can be stretched over ten, fifteen, or even thirty years in
some cases.
Bond transactions often involve a financial intermediary, usually an
investment banking firm that assists issuers in finding buyers for the bond. By
marketing to a larger audience in the broader capital markets, the financial
intermediary attempts to obtain the best possible interest rate and terms for the
issuer, which may often be better than those available from commercial banks.
An important distinction between bank debt and bond indentures is that unlike
bank loans, bonds are classified as “securities” and are therefore subject to a
variety of securities laws. Note, however, that §103(c) of Tax Code treats all
obligations as “bonds” even if they are bank loans, finance leases, installment
purchases, or actual bond indentures.147 Thus, while the debt markets differentiate
substantially between bank debt and bond indentures, the Tax Code does not. For
purposes of clarity, subsequent use of the term “bonds” in this article refers to
bond indentures held by the capital markets and does not include the other forms of
governmental debt considered to be “bonds” under §103.
C. Tax-Exempt Debt
Tax-exempt debt is debt where the interest paid to the debt holder is not
subject to taxation.148 Because the interest is tax-free, investors are able to generate
the same after-tax return with a lower interest rate as they would from a similar
taxable investment that pays a higher interest rate. In addition to the availability of
lower interest rates, sometimes as much as three-hundred basis points lower,149
longer terms are also available in the tax-exempt market.
1. The Historical Justification for States’ Tax-Free Bond Authority: Federal
Subsidy of Governmental Obligations and State Sovereignty
When the first Tax Code was established in 1913, state and local bond
issuances were minimal and Congress desired to avoid political opposition on the
matter.150 The initial rationale for the exemption has its roots in a constitutional
theory of intergovernmental tax immunity.151 The modern rationale for exempting
147
26 USC § 103(c); this treatment is also the same for tribal debt under Section 7871(c) of the
tax code.
148
26 USC § 103(a); see Gelfand §§ 5:01 et seq. for a thorough discussion of the history and
policy rationale of tax-exempt municipal debt.
149
See Handbook III, Sec 21.03. Financial measures are often expressed in terms of “basis
points.” A 300 basis point difference is the same as a three percent difference.
150
Gelfand § 1:13.
151
See Pollock v. Farmer’s Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 585-86 15 S.Ct. 673 (1895)
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municipal bond interest from taxation is a federal policy of supporting states in
their operation as governmental entities.152 It has long been recognized that
“[l]ong-term debt obligations are an essential source of funding for state and local
governments”153 and that taxing interest paid on state and local bonds “may strike
at the very heart of state and local government activities.”154
The ability to issue tax-free debt is crucial not to investors, but to states,
because investors are willing to accept lower interest rates in exchange for the taxexemption.155 In effect, the tax-exemption, although falling to the individual bond
buyer, is a subsidy to the state treasury.156 The federal government has an interest
in subsidizing157 state and local government operations because the subsidy both
facilitates governmental operations at the local level so that the federal government
does not itself have to provide these services and because it places control over
what kinds of operations are undertaken in the hands of local officials, thus
removing these operations from the federal government.158
This latter rationale – local control – is related to a notion of state sovereignty.
Indeed, the doctrine of state sovereignty stems from the basic constitutional
structure that endows the federal government with a limited set of enumerated
powers.159 Further, the Supreme Court has long recognized the power of the
federal government to tax states as a threat to state sovereignty.160 To the extent
(holding that a tax on interest income derived from a state bond, whether imposed by the Federal
government or by another state, was unconstitutional as an indirect tax on the state because of the
burden it imposed on the state’s ability to issue the bond.) The Court reasoned that, although the tax
was imposed on the bond-holder, the tax was considered to be “on” the state because a portion of the
burden, or the “incidence” of the tax, would be borne by the state in an increased interest rate or
fewer buyers. The Court’s rationale was not limited to bonds in particular, but was based on a theory
of intergovernmental tax immunity under which it was unconstitutional to tax any state-derived
income, whether from bonds, employment or leases. See also South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505,
516-17, 108 S.Ct. 1355 (1988) (discussing intergovernmental tax immunity at time Pollock was
decided). This rationale was later repudiated by the Supreme Court in Graves v. New York ex rel.
O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 480 (1939) (“The theory ... that a tax on income is legally or economically a
tax on its source is no longer tenable.”) See also South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. at 523-24
(holding that interest paid on state bonds is not immune from Federal taxation under the
constitutional doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity).
152
As noted infra, the exemption from federal taxation for interest paid on state-issued debt is
also related to a notion of state sovereignty. This notion of state sovereignty roughly parallels the
doctrine of Tribal sovereignty, and thus provides analogous support for equal tax-free bond authority.
153
South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. at 531 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
154
Id.
155
Id. at 185.
156
Id.
157
The amount of the subsidy is a matter of empirical analysis beyond the scope of this Article;
suffice it to say, however, the subsidy enjoyed by states is significant. The Supreme Court has
recognized that without the exemption, states would have to increase the interest they pay on bonds
by between 28% and 35% over what they are able to pay with the subsidy. Because bond revenue is
so important to states, “governmental operations will be hindered severely if the cost of capital rises
by one third.” South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. at 531 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
158
See Klein supra note 155.
159
See Lawrence Tribe, American Constitutional Law 381 (2d. ed. 1988). See also, Tenth
Amendment.
160
See South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S at 533 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Chief Justice
Marshall from McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 431 (1819), “the power to tax involves the
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that states are sovereigns, the federal policy of exempting interest paid on state
bonds issued to finance and effectuate state policy from federal taxation is a
recognition and affirmation of that sovereignty.161
2. Uses for Tax-Exempt Debt
States issue tax-exempt bonds not only to finance a core set of traditional
governmental purposes such as building schools, roads, and sewers but also to
finance airports, docks, commuting facilities, utilities, mortgages, public golf
courses, and even state lottery buildings and horse race tracks.162 Changes to the
Tax Code in 1986 sought to restrict this practice by placing limitations on private
activity bonds.163 After these changes, some municipalities began locating other
sources of revenue to remain within the permissible tax-exempt bounds while still
supporting private use projects. Discussing this phenomenon in the case of
professional sports stadiums, Prof. Frank Mayer wrote:
The practical result of the 1986 Act was to change the method of debt
repayment. Municipal officials and stadium owners structured their debt
repayment so that revenue streams from the actual stadium accounted for less
than 10% of the total repayment, while the public was responsible for the
remaining 90%. This financing plan forced the federal government to
recognize a stadium construction project as a public facility and consequently
permit tax-exempt bond financing. In order to reach the 90% public funding
level, municipal governments have employed techniques including increasing
the sales tax, tourist tax, sin taxes, and implementing a tax on lottery
proceeds.164

power to destroy.”)
161
See Williams supra note 27, at 358 (“Principles of federalism, together with practical
financial considerations, dictate that the capability of state and local governments to raise and use
revenue should be facilitated and enhanced whenever possible in order that they may better serve the
needs of their people.”)
162
See William A. Klein, Joseph Bankman, Daniel Shaviro, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 186
th
(13 ed. 2003).
163

IRS Revenue Ruling 03-116 explains the section 141 definition of private activity
bonds as follows:
Section 141 provides, in part, that a bond is a private activity bond if the bond is issued as
part of an issue that meets the private business use test of § 141(b)(1) and the private
security or payment test of § 141(b)(2). The private business use test is met if more than 10
percent of the proceeds of an issue are to be used for any private business use. The private
security or payment test is met if the payment of the principal of, or the interest on, more
than 10 percent of the proceeds of an issue is directly or indirectly (1) secured by an interest
in property used or to be used for a private business use, (2) secured by an interest in
payments in respect of such property, or (3) to be derived from payments, whether or not to
the issuer, in respect of property, or borrowed money, used or to be used for a private
business use.
Section 141(e) provides, in part, that the term “qualified bond” includes any private
activity bond that (1) is a qualified 501(c)(3) bond; (2) meets the applicable requirements of
§ 146; and (3) meets the applicable requirements of each subsection of § 147. While §
103(a) of the 1986 Tax Code exempts from gross income interest on state and local bonds,
such exemption is not extended to private activity bonds which are not also qualified bonds.
I.R.C. § 103(b)(1).
164
Frank A. Mayer, III, Stadium Financing: Where We Are, How We Got Here, and Where We
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The more popular approach, at least concerning hotels and convention centers,
involves management agreements between a private entity and a municipality
arranging for the private business to run the facility. This practice accelerated after
1997 when the permissible length of these management contracts was extended
from five to fifteen years, initiating a “boom in publicly financed hotels.”165 Hotel
projects, involving tax-exempt issuances of hundreds of millions of dollars, have
commenced in a number of municipalities, including the following:
• The Austin City Council approved the authorization of up to $275 million
of tax-exempt bonds to finance an 800-room hotel near the city’s newly
expanded convention center.166
• Baltimore issued $305 million to build a Hilton convention hotel in
downtown Baltimore.167
• The Chicago Metropolitan Pier and Exposition Authority issued $133
million of tax-exempt hotel revenue bonds for a Hyatt Hotel168
• The City of Omaha Convention Hotel Corporation sold $103.5 million of
tax-exempt bonds for a 450-room hotel to be managed by Hilton Hotel.169
• The Denver Convention Center Hotel Authority issued $349 million in
revenue bonds to build a 1,100-room hotel managed by the Hyatt
Corporation.170
• The South Carolina Jobs-Economic Development Authority issued $63.4
million in bonds to fund construction of a 404-room hotel to be operated
by Radisson Hotels International Corporation.171
• The Indianapolis Local Public Improvement Bond Bank issued $18.2
million in tax-exempt bonds to help fund a 230-room luxury Hilton
hotel.172
• Overland Park, Kansas, issued $87 million in bonds to build a 412-room,
full-service convention center hotel operated under a 15-year contract by
Sheraton Operating Corporation.173
• The city of West Palm Beach, Florida, issued $55 million in tax-exempt
Are Going, 12 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 195, 210-11 (2005).
165
Mary Wisniewski, Cities Play Hotel Game: Face Choices on Independence, Risk, BOND
BUYER, August 30, 2001, at 1.
166
Elizabeth Albanese, Austin City Council Approves Bond Authorization for Hotel Financing,
BOND BUYER, March 14, 2001, at 5.
167
Andrew Ackerman, Baltimore Convention Hotel Plan Gets Second Nod From City Council,
BOND BUYER, August 17, 2005, at 5.
168
Karen Pierog, Chicago hotel revenue to back exposition authority bond sale, BOND BUYER,
February 26, 1996, at 1.
169
Elizabeth Carvlin, Deal in Focus: City-Backed Omaha Hotel Granted Rare Insurance
Coverage, BOND BUYER, April 10, 2002, at 34.
170
Elizabeth Albanese, Deal in Focus: Denver Selling $349 Million for Convention Center
Hotel, BOND BUYER, June 17, 2003, at 27.
171
Christine Albano, Big Entrance: Hotel Deals Set Off Frenzied Buying, Earn High Yields,
BOND BUYER, June 6, 2001, at 1.
172
Elizabeth Carvlin, Indianapolis Bond Bank Plans $28M For Hotel, With Moral Obligation,
BOND BUYER, May 4, 2004, at 4.
173
Christine Albano, High-Yield Focus: Kansas Hotel Deal’s Revised Structure Eases Buy-Side
Concerns, BOND BUYER, December 20, 2000, at 7.
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revenue bonds for a parking structure for CityPlace, a $550 million mixedused development downtown.174
• The Virginia Economic Development Review Issued $10 million in tax
exempt bonds to renovate the Stonewall Jackson Hotel, which contains
124 deluxe guest rooms.175
• The District of Columbia Council approved a measure authorizing the
redevelopment of the Washington Convention Center site, which could
eventually lead to up to $1.3 billion in tax-exempt bond issuances.176
Private activity bonds are still widely used as an important tool for state and
local economic development.177 A similar practice involves the issuance of taxexempt bonds to build hotels in economically depressed areas eligible by their
empowerment zone status. Such was the situation in the following instances:
• Little Rock, Arkansas, voters approved the issuance of $19 million in taxexempt empowerment zone revenue bonds to renovate the Little Rock
Hilton.178
• San Antonio issued $130 million of tax-exempt empowerment zone bonds
to finance a new Hyatt Corporation 1,000-room convention center hotel.179
• The St. Louis Industrial Development Authority issued $98 million of taxexempt federal empowerment zone bonds to partially fund the construction
of a convention center hotel.180
Tax-exempt bonds have not only been used to build hotels and convention
centers but also to finance horse tracks owned by counties or municipalities.
• In 1987, Polk County, Iowa officials issued $40 million in tax-exempt
bonds to build the Prairie Meadows Horse Racing Track.181
• Retama Park outside of San Antonio was financed with $75 million in taxexempt debt. financing.182 Retama Development, the nonprofit
organization set to by the city to construct and equip the racetrack in 1997,
subsequently issued $93.9 million in refunding bonds.183
• The Grand Prairie Sports Facilities Development Corporation refinanced
“one of the most successful horse racing tracks in the state” in part by
174

Shelly Sigo, West Palm Beach, Fla., Still Has All-Stars in Its Eyes, BOND BUYER, July 20,
2001, at 37.
175
Matthew Vadum, VIRGINIAL: Hotel Gets Facelift, BOND BUYER, October 27, 2005, at 35.
176
Matthew, Vadum, Old D.C. Convention Center Site Gets Go-Ahead for Redevelopment,
BOND BUYER, June 8, 2005, at 4.
177
Aprill, supra note __, at 342.
178
Elizabeth Albanese, Little Rock Voters Approve Hotel Bond Issue, BOND BUYER, July 11,
2002, at 3.
179
Elizabeth Albanese, San Antonio Deal for Hyatt Hotel Empowered With Tax-Exemption,
BOND BUYER, April 26, 2005, at 1.
180
Yvette Shields, St. Louis’ Hotel Financing Deal Wins Investment-Grade Rating, BOND
BUYER, November 15, 2000, at 3.
181
Will County Bet on Racetrack Bonds? HOUSTON BUSINESS JOURNAL, August 24, 1992, at 1.
182
Janin Friend, Lone Star racetrack is set to issue debt, but some in industry say deal is risky,
BOND BUYER, July 7, 1994, at 1.
183
Emily Newman, Tax Enforcement: IRS: Texas Development Corp.’s $171M of Debt May Be
Taxable, BOND BUYER, January 12, 2005, at 5.
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issuing $15.2 million of tax-exempt debt.184
3. Additional Restrictions on Tribal Tax-Exempt Debt
While the federal policy of exempting interest paid on state bonds from federal
taxation is a recognition and affirmation of that state’s sovereignty, a similar
recognition and affirmation of sovereignty unfortunately does not extend to Indian
tribes to the same degree as state and local governments because tribes face two
additional restrictions that do not apply to their counterparts. In the first instance
Indian tribes cannot issue PABs similar to those issued by state and local
governments.185 As mentioned previously, an additional restriction limits tribal taxexempt bonding authority to those projects where “substantially all” of the
borrowed proceeds “are to be used in the exercise of any essential governmental
function.”186 As the tax-base of a tribe is usually insufficient for a tribe to issue
general obligation bonds187 and since the revenue from a revenue bond is usually
linked to the project being financed,188 this additional restriction to “customary”
governmental activity places tribes at a tremendous disadvantage relative to the
capital markets and is inequitable when compared to other forms of municipal
debt.
III. LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY MANEUVERING OVER TRIBAL TAX STATUS
A. The Tax Status of Indian Tribes before the 1982 Tribal Tax Act
The Tribal Tax Status Act was the culmination of a huge effort by tribes and
their advocates on Capitol Hill to achieve a measure of equality with states in the
Tax Code.189 Before its passage, and despite the fact the federal government had
for more than 150 years recognized Indian tribes as sovereign governmental
entities with obligations and responsibilities to their constituents equal to those of
states, Indian tribes occupied a strange and internally inconsistent niche within
federal tax laws. Prior to 1982, IRS Revenue Rulings rather than statutes governed
the taxation of tribes.190 Under Revenue Ruling 67-284, the IRS reasoned that
because tribes occupy a space in government roughly analogous to states, income
184
Darrell Preston, Deal in Focus: Texas Town Cleans Up at the Track With Recent Refunding,
BOND BUYER, March 30, 1999, at 22.
185
See Williams supra note 27, at 382; Aprill supra note 27 at 335; see also Hyatt, Israel, et al,
supra note 24, p. 19 (“State and local governments often issue tax-exempt private activity bonds for
the benefit of nonprofit corporations, or to finance mortgage loans for first-time low- and moderateincome home buyers, or to finance low- and moderate-income residential rental property. Private
activity bonds are also issued for airports, docks, and wharves, solid waste facilities, sewage
facilities, and certain other facilities.”). Under current law, Indian tribes are barred from issuing
private activity bonds for anything other than a tribal manufacturing facility. 26 USC §§ 7871(c)(2)(c)(3).
186
26 USC § 7871(c)(1). “Substantially all” is not defined in the statute but is believed to mean
at least 95% of the proceeds. See Hyatt, Israel, et al, supra note 24, p. 18
187
See Williams supra note 27, at 385 (“few Indian communities enjoy the thriving economic
environment necessary to sustain a stable tax base”).
188
See Aprill supra note 27, at 342.
189
See generally, id. (detailing testimony by Indians and comments by various Congressmen in
considering the 1982 Act).
190
See Aprill supra note 27 at 335; Williams supra note 27, at 358.
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of a tribal government like that going to a state, is exempt from federal taxation.191
The IRS failed to pursue the same logic, however, when it denied tribes the ability
to issue tax-free debt. Revenue Ruling 68-231 erroneously reasoned that since the
powers of a tribe are delegated to it by the federal government192 rather than a state
(in that case, Washington), it cannot be considered a “state” for purposes of I.R.C.
section 103’s exemption from federal taxation for interest paid on state and
municipal debt.193 Lingering uncertainty because of inconsistencies in how the IRS
made its rulings on the tax status of tribes led Congress to take up consideration of
a comprehensive Indian tax law.
The 1982 act was not the first serious attempt at comprehensive Indian tax
legislation, as a bill that would have granted tribes a similar tax status to states was
introduced in 1975.194 This legislation proposed equal treatment in the areas of
federal excise taxes, charitable donation deductions, and deductibility of property
taxes. An important provision would have authorized tribes to issue tax-exempt
bonds on nearly the same grounds as states under I.R.C. section 103.195 The House
Ways and Means Committee reported H.R. 8989 favorably, 196 but the legislation
was not considered by the full House.197 No further action was taken198 until
Congress’s consideration of a senate bill199 that would eventually become the 1982
Tribal Tax Status Act.
B. The Passage of the 1982 Tribal Tax Status Act
Senate Bill 1298 was introduced by five senators200 for the purpose of
191

Rev. Rul. 67-284. Williams notes that the IRS made this ruling despite the absence of any
express Congressional authority for such an exemption, a true anomaly in tax law. Williams supra
note 27, at 359 n.113. This ruling, then indicates the strength of the premise that Indian tribes are in
fact political entities within the United States with duties and obligations owed to their constituents.
192
See Handbook III, supra note , § 5.A.1.
193
Rev. Rul. 68-231. As Williams notes, critics have argued that the IRS has adopted
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exemption from federal excise taxes under I.R.C. section 4224 for the sale of an automobile to an
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(R-Ore.), Bob Packwood (R-Ore.), and Max Baucus (D-Mont). S. 1298.
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equalizing the treatment of states and tribes in a number of areas of the Tax Code,
including tax-free bonding authority. Senate Bill 1298 would have enabled tribes
to issue tax-exempt debt obligations to finance their governmental activities under
section 103 of the Internal Revenue Code.201 Tribes would have achieved equal
treatment with states by virtue of the legislation’s reference to section 103, which
defines states’ tax-free bonding authority. At the time this authority was quite
broad and included the authority to issue controversial industrial development
bonds for a variety of projects. Tribes were also given such authority in the senate
bill as long as the trade or business financed by the issuance occurred on the tribe’s
reservation.202 The Senate Finance Committee reported the bill favorably and
recommended passage without amendment.203 The Senate incorporated this bill
into House Bill 5470, the Periodic Payments Settlement Act, which the House
passed without the tribal tax legislation piece.204 Representative Sam Gibbons (DFl), in particular, objected to the tribal tax provisions, a setback which sent the bill
to a conference committee to which Representative Gibbons was named.205
While the stated purpose of the introduced legislation was to eliminate the
perception of differences between tribal governments and state or local
governments,206 the ultimate legislation that emerged from the House-Senate
Conference Committee emphasized rather than eliminated those differences. Those
fundamental changes in the legislation are detailed in the rest of this section. Part
V will make the argument that, under the Memmi typology, those changes were
based on racist notions and that their continued existence in the Tax Code is a
perpetuation of that racism.
The first major change in the legislation was to specifically prevent tribes from
issuing any tax-free PABs. Tribes retained the ability to issue general obligation
bonds, traditionally used for funding ventures such as school construction.207
Tribal governments, however, “lack[ed] a diversified economy as well as the
broad, stable tax base” necessary to issue general obligation bonds.208 Thus, tribes
were “given bonding authority they were unable to use and denied bonding
authority they would have welcomed.”209 Prior to the emergence of the conference
bill, every version of the Tribal Tax Status Act had included specific authority for
tribes to engage in at least some limited form of tax-exempt private activity bond
financing.210 None of the witnesses or members of the Senate or House in printed
hearings, committee reports, or debate had ever raised an objection to allowing
tribes to enjoy the same status as state and local governments relative to private
activity bonds.211 Moreover, the Treasury Department had specifically endorsed all
201
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of the earlier versions of the Tribal Tax Status Act, including the provisions Indian
tribes used to issue tax-exempt PABs, stating “that tribal governments should be
treated for federal tax purposes in the same manner as state and local
governments.” 212 Treasury supported this legislation, despite its broader efforts to
generally curtail and limit tax-exempt PABs,213 arguing that entities that “are
similarly situated should be treated alike for tax purposes if the law is to be applied
fairly and equitably.”214 Given the limited tribal tax base215 available for general
obligation bonds,216 the ability to issue revenue bonds217 was one of the most
important provisions sought by tribal governments.
The Conference Committee Report, however, stated quite clearly that “tribal
governments are not permitted to issue private activity bonds ([such as] industrial
development bonds [or] mortgage subsidy bonds),”218 thus ensuring that tribal
bonds could not be used for economic development projects that might generate
profits for private actors.219
If the elimination of any chance of PABs issuance were not bad enough, the
Conference Committee Report also added the additional requirement on tribes’
authority to issue tax-free debt. Tribes were authorized to issue tax-exempt bonds
“only if such obligation is part of an issue substantially all of the proceeds of
which are to be used in the exercise of any essential governmental function.”220
The essential governmental function language may seem innocuous enough, since
under section 103, states are granted tax-free bond authority as a tool with which to
perform their general governmental functions.221 The “essential governmental
function” element of the legislation, however, was unmistakably an “additional
requirement”222 that was not imposed on states. Thus, by virtue of the 1982 Tribal
Tax Status Act, Indian tribes only receive tax-free treatment of their debt
obligations under a narrower set of projects than states. The open question after
passage of the 1982 act was, what was an “essential governmental function?”
C. Initial Implementation of the 1982 Tribal Tax Status Act
The Conference Committee Report accompanying the 1982 act offered little
explanation of the essential governmental function requirement but did indicate
that tribes were granted tax-free bond authority to undertake only a core set of
government projects, and that Congress was primarily concerned with preventing
private actors from benefiting from the tax subsidy. Because the essential
governmental function test also circumscribes tribes’ general ability to issue taxfree debt obligations under section 103; however, the issue becomes whether tribes
212
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themselves (where no private entity benefits) can engage in a broad range of
activities – such as construction of hotel resorts and public-use golf courses – that
are not necessarily within a set of core government-provided services.
In the wake of the passage of the 1982 act, the IRS was charged with
determining the scope of tribes’ tax-free bonding authority. As Professor Ellen
Aprill points out, however, defining the term “essential governmental function” is
no easy task.223 Several Supreme Court cases illustrate the ambiguity of this term
and its ultimate “unworkability.”224 Early cases upheld federal taxation of income
paid to the trustees of the Boston Elevated Railway Company because operating a
street railway was proprietary rather than governmental,225 yet struck down a tax
imposed on the salary of a New York water system engineer because operating a
water system had developed into a governmental function.226 Later cases
effectively eliminated the term from Congress’s arsenal by declaring that “what
might have been viewed in an earlier day as an improvident or even dangerous
extension of state activities may today be deemed indispensable,”227 and that the
distinction had become “too entangled in expediency to serve as a dependable legal
criterion.”228
To address this issue, tribes obtained legal representation to advise the
Treasury Department that the essential governmental function requirement should
be construed broadly in light of the overriding purpose of the 1982 Tribal Tax Act
to “provide relief to Indians.”229 The strategy worked, and Indians were given taxfree bond authority under the regulations not only for any activity that would be
exempt if undertaken by a state or local government but also any activity for which
Indian tribes receive funding from the Bureau of Indian Affairs under either the
Snyder Act230 or the Indian Self-Determination Act.231 Because both acts fund a
broad range of activities,232 tribal bond authority was also relatively broad. For
223
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instance, tribes could issue tax-free debt obligations to finance “general support”
activities and “industrial assistance and advancement.”233
Despite the broad language, very few bond issuances were actually made
under the 1982 act and the arguably generous (for tribes)234 regulations. Aprill
reports that only seven tribal issuances had occurred by the time Congress revisited
the legislation in January of 1988.235 Of these projects, only one was a traditional
governmental function on the reservation; six were “off-reservation leveraged buyouts.”236 For example, one of the reported issuances helped the Salt River PimaMaricopa (AZ) Indians purchase a cement factory to be used primarily as an
income-generating investment to help pay for other tribal services.237
Despite the small number of reported transactions, this relatively broad
bonding authority turned out to be short-lived as both the language of the statute
and the agency’s approach to enforcing it would soon become severely restrictive
on tribes.
D. Congress Slams the Door --The 1987 Amendments to the Tribal Tax Status Act
Five years after the 1982 act, Representative Gibbons sponsored a measure in
the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987238 to restrict the use of tribal
bonds by clarifying the essential governmental function requirement.239 The House
Committee Report explained that in light of “recent reports of Indian tribal
governments issuing tax-exempt bonds for what are substantively interests in
commercial and industrial enterprises,” the “committee believes [that] it is
appropriate to reiterate the scope of bond authority granted to Indian tribal
governments.”240 The clarification measure thus limited essential functions for
purposes of tribal tax-free bond authority to those functions that are “customarily
performed by State and local governments with general taxing powers.”241
233
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In addition, on September 10, 1987, Gibbons wrote a letter to Treasury
Secretary James Baker imploring the department to investigate leveraged buy-outs
by tribes.242 He also noted that such projects are a “far cry from schools, streets and
sewers,”243 recalling the one line of explanation in the 1982 legislative history
explaining the essential governmental function requirement.244
Although it had passed the house, Gibbons’ amendment was not included in
the Senate version of the 1987 Budget Act, and it was opposed by many in the
Senate as too draconian. Twenty-two senators wrote a letter to the Chairman of the
Senate Finance Committee, to oppose the measure in Conference.245 Their concern
was that the amendment would stifle tribes’ efforts to “decrease tribal
unemployment, alleviate poverty, preserve natural or cultural resources of the tribe
or contribute to tribal economic activity.”246 As an alternative, this group proposed
targeting potential abuses more precisely by eliminating bonding authority for
projects that produced only passive income from investments in real estate or other
off-reservation ventures.247 This less restrictive alternative would have allowed
tribes to utilize tax-free debt obligations much in the same manner as states.
Unfortunately, Rep. Gibbons was able to secure an appointment to the Conference
Committee and was able to push through his stifling amendment with only one
relatively insignificant carve-out for tribes.248
While Aprill describes the amendment as a “measure to tighten the tribal bond
measures by limiting essential governmental functions to those customarily
financed with exempt bonds by state and local governments,”249 the specific
statutory language had the potential for a much more restrictive interpretation:
limiting tribal tax-exempt bond authority to those projects typically financed with
general tax revenue, a narrower set of projects than those typically financed
through tax-free debt obligations.250
E. The IRS Nails the Door Shut -- Aggressive Enforcement of the Essential
Governmental Function Requirement
In the wake of the 1987 amendment, one issue facing tribes seeking to utilize
tax free debt obligations is that Congress has provided little guidance, other than
242
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the limiting language in the 1987 Conference Report, as to what is and what is not
an essential governmental function customarily performed by states.251 As noted
above, the uncertainty engendered by these terms provides little guidance for
regulated entities, in this case, Indian tribes,252 and much leeway to regulators, in
this case, the IRS. As it turns out, the IRS has taken its cue from Representative
Gibbons and has recently decided to aggressively enforce an extremely narrow
interpretation of the essential governmental function requirement. Indian Country
Today noted that “Indian country as a whole is becoming more familiar” with the
IRS’s enforcement efforts because of its inclusion in tribal tax-free bond financing
in its investigative audits.253 For the years 2002, 2003, and 2004, state and local
governments issued an average of 14,038 tax exempt bonds.254 Over the same
period, tribal government annually issued an average of 5 tax-exempt bonds.255 For
the years 2002, 2003, and 2004, the Tax Exempt Bonds Office closed an average
of 363 audits each year.256 Assuming that an exam takes two years to complete,257
this time period results in approximately 1.29% of all state and local tax-exempt
issues being audited; however, not all of those obligations are considered bonds by
the capital markets.258
Based on an initial survey of bond lawyers, approximately 20% of all bonds
under the Tax Code are bond indentures that are held by the capital markets. Thus,
the approximate lifetime audit hazard rate for municipal bond indentures is
approximately one-half of one percent. In contrast, there was general belief among
professionals in the field of tribal debt issuances that the percent of tribal bond
issues audited is substantially greater. In a March 2005 Bond Buyer article, Charles
251
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Anderson, field operations manager for the IRS tax-exempt bond office, stated the
intention to conduct “a dozen or more examinations of tribal bond issues within the
next year or so.”259 In September 2005, Charles Anderson stated that twelve tribal
tax-exempt bonds, six tribal conduit bonds, and six direct tribal issues, are
currently being challenged by the IRS.260 Christie Jacobs of the office of Indian
Tribal Governments at the IRS stated during February 2006 that 8 to 10 tribal taxexempt issues were currently under audit.261 Dale White, general counsel for the
Mohegan Tribe, states that of the tribe’s two bond issuances, one has been audited.
In a January 12, 2006 Memorandum, several Dorsey & Whitney tax attorneys
expressed the following opinion regarding the IRS’ enforcement practices:
We believe that, if the Service were forced to defend its position before a
court, the tribes should prevail on both of these issues [direct tribal issues and
conduit issues]. Our concern is that, by initiating numerous audits against
individual tribal issuers, the Service is (a) taking on the tribes one by one, (b)
without the tribes being able to coordinate their analysis, research and arguments,
(c) in a situation where it is very difficult to get the issues before a court for
review.262
This disparate treatment does not show signs of waning. Rick Saskal, of The
Bond Buyer, recently wrote, “The Internal Revenue Service has been stepping up
audit reviews of the tax-exempt status of tribal bond issues.”263
To empirically determine the audit hazard rate for tribal bonds, in April, 2006,
the author and his tribal finance research team from the University of Michigan
met with officials and researchers from the Tax-Exempt Bond division of the
Internal Revenue Service to discuss the issue of tribal tax-exempt bonds and
develop a research plan to examine whether or not tribal governments were subject
to a disproportionate audit rate for their bonds. For this work, the IRS examined a
particular form that is filed by all governments, including tribal governments,
whenever they issue a debt obligation of any kind. When governments enter into
debt obligations, if the interest paid to the lender is tax-exempt, then a form 8038
needs to be filed with the IRS. If the obligation is for an amount greater than
$100,000, then a form 8038G is filed, otherwise a form 8038GC is filed.
In collaboration with the University of Michigan researchers, IRS researchers
determined that 88 tribes had filed one or more informational returns between
January 1, 2002 and December 31, 2005 (note that this data reflects direct tribal
issues only; conduit issues are not included in these figures):
Form 8038G
136
Form 8038GC
169
259
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On either form, Line 20 allows the tribe to check a box to indicate whether the
obligation is a lease or installment purchase. The data was then broken down into
the following:
Form 8038GC
Leases or Installment Sales
105
Bank Loans or Bond Indentures
64
Form 8038G
Leases or Installment Sales
46
Bank Loans or Bond Indentures 90
The following was also determined, however, in the course of the research:
• While some tribal debt examinations were initiated from referrals, the
majority of tribal debt examination cases were initiated by the IRS through
its normal case selection process.
• Of the 305 filings (issues), slightly less than 1% are being examined
• Of the 88 tribes that filed, approximately 3% have bonds under
examination.
• The total dollar amount of debt issued during this time period is around
$700,000,000.
Although a greater level of detail would of course be desirable, the IRS is
limited in its ability to disclose based on rather strict confidentiality requirements.
Thus, the remaining data analysis and conclusions in this section do not necessarily
reflect the views of the IRS.
A preliminary survey of tribal bond lawyers indicates that for every tribal bond
indenture requiring an 8038G filing, four to five bank loans are also closed that
require an 8038G filing. Thus, for the 90 form 8038G filings from 2002 through
2005, assuming that 20% were for bond indentures, 18 tribal bonds indentures
were issued between 2002 and 2005, or an average of 4.5 per year. Municipal bond
indentures of less than $100,000 rarely exist, if at all, so the 8038GC filings have
been excluded. If those are not excluded, the average number of bonds is six per
year; however, data from Thompson Financial on tribal bonds issued between 2002
and 2005 indicates that there were 20 bonds issued.
Based on information from tribes and tribal bond attorneys for tribes that are
currently being audited, all of the audits for debt obligations issued between 2002
and 2005 were for bond indentures, none was for bank debt.
Using the IRS data, the three audits for bonds indentures issued between 2002
and 2005 represent 16.6% of all tribal bond indentures issued during that same
period, more than thirty-two times the hazard rate for state and local bonds during
the same period.264 Using the Thompson data generates a tribal hazard rate of 15%,
or twenty-nine times the hazard rate for state and local governments. In either case,
the audit hazard rate for tribal bonds in only their first four years after issuance is
substantially more than an order of magnitude greater than the lifetime hazard rate
264
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for state and local government bonds.
The instances of tribal audits appears even more disturbing when one considers
the fact that tribal tax-exempt issues make up only one-tenth of one percent of the
tax-exempt bond market.265 For the years 2002-2004, state and local governments
issued on average $363.6 billion of tax-exempt debt266 while tribal governments
issued on average only $202 million of tax-exempt debt.267 The focus of IRS
resources on issuances making up merely .1% of the total market by itself raises a
presumption of improper IRS practices toward tribes.
F. Is the IRS Blocking a Fire Escape? Uncertainty Regarding Tribal Conduit
Financing
Constricted by the discriminatory essential governmental function
requirement, some tribes have chosen to finance projects such as hotels on a
taxable basis; however, several tribes attempted to use an alternative tax-exempt
mechanism referred to as a “conduit financing.”268 In a conduit financing the taxexempt security is actually issued by a local government agency (referred to as the
conduit issuer) to finance a project for a third party (referred to as the conduit
borrower). The security for this type of issue either is the credit of the conduit
borrower or pledged revenues from the project itself rather than the credit of the
conduit issuer. Such securities are not general obligations of the conduit issuer
because the conduit borrower is liable for generating the pledged revenues. Since
the conduit issuer is not subject to the “essential governmental function” test, the
conduit mechanism should enable a tribe to finance projects with tax-exempt
bonds that it might otherwise have to finance on a taxable basis.269
Additionally, conduit financing is an established form of public finance
typically utilized by 501(c)(3) (non-profit) organizations, such as charity hospitals.
Conduit financing has also won the endorsement of the Tax Court. In Fairfax
County Economic Development Authority v. Commissioner,270 the Tax Court held
that the development authority was the real issuer of industrial development bonds
used to build a facility, a portion of which would be leased to the United States
Government Printing Office.271 It reached this conclusion despite the fact that the
federal government was the obligor of the bonds because the credit of the
government as a lessor of the retail space backed the bonds.272 The Tax Court
reasoned that form governs substance in section 103 cases and held that the
development authority be respected as the issuer of the bonds, even though the
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federal government was the real obligor.273
Despite the criticism of the IRS’s aggressive approach in the 2002 FSA,
however, the service is also taking a hostile enforcement stance against conduit
financing by tribes as well.274 The IRS has now challenged 100% of the tribal
attempts to issue conduit bonds.275
IV. APPLICATION OF THE MEMMI TYPOLOGY
The legislative and regulatory activities against tribal bonding authority are
clearly harmful and discriminitory, but can they still be fairly labeled as racist
under the Memmi typology, with its four moments of racism?
1.
2.
3.
4.

An insistence on difference, whether real or imaginary
The imposition of a negative valuation upon those seen as differing
Generalizing that difference to an entire group that is then deprecated in turn.
Justifying hostility, aggression, or privilege based on that generalized
difference.276

Thus, in order to sustain the charge of racism in the Tax Code, it is necessary
to elucidate how the ultimate legislation was shaped by perceptions of difference
that were generalized to a broader group and how the negative connotations of the
perceived difference were used to justify the hostility or aggression against the
broader group, either during the legislative process or in subsequent IRS
enforcement actions. When analyzed within Memmi’s typology, the actions of
Representative Gibbons and the ultimate acquiescence of his legislative colleagues
provide just such evidence. Details of the IRS enforcement actions provide further
evidence.
A. Applying the Memmi Typology to Rep. Gibbons
1. The Strategy of Difference
Williams has carefully documented the discourse of difference regarding
Indians from the moment of first contact between Europeans and the indigenous
inhabitants of North America,277 so by the time a 33 year-old Sam Gibbons was
first elected to the Florida legislature in 1953, Indian tribes were already well
273
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entrenched as different in the minds of many Florida politicians. Having grown up
in 1920s and 1930s, Gibbons was likely influenced by the dominant view of
Indians as anachronistic savages, wholly separate from civilized society.278 Having
attended all-white institutions for his undergraduate and legal education,279
Gibbons was likely influenced by the rhetoric and practice of segregation. As a
practicing lawyer, Gibbons might possibly have taken note of the racist discourse
used to describe Indian tribes in the 1950s, including language used by the
Supreme Court in Tee-Hit-Ton Indians vs. United States:
Every American schoolboy knows that the savage tribes of this continent
were deprived of their ancestral ranges by force and that, even when the
Indians ceded millions of acres by treaty in return for blankets, food and
trinkets, it was not a sale but the conquerors’ will that deprived them of their
land.280

Although they were likely a source of campfire stories during Gibbons’
schoolboy years, the Florida Seminoles were recognized as a sovereign tribe in
1957, and were thus governed by separate laws and regulations than other
Floridians, such as Title 25 of the U.S. Code and Title 25 of the Code of Federal
Regulations. As Williams notes, even if Gibbons was not overtly racist, there is a
substantial body of empirical and theoretical research that “demonstrates that the
cognitive biases that can give rise to prejudice and racist attitudes can operate in an
unconscious, automatic, uncontrolled fashion.”281
However, Gibbons was probably not alone, given that after centuries of overt
and covert hostility by the United States, the weakened economic state of the
Florida Seminoles probably did not resemble a sovereign government in the minds
of most Floridians either. Even once they were acknowledged as a sovereign
entity, the likely perception was that the tribal government did not provide services
but instead relied on the federal government. At a minimum, the “savage”
existence of the Florida Seminoles during his childhood and continuing through his
election to Congress would certainly have entrenched the tribe as being different in
Gibbons’ mind. The imputation of a negative value to that difference, however,
was evident in one instance in a long-running dispute between the Florida
Seminole tribe and Representative Gibbons. By all accounts, Gibbons harbored a
lingering hostility toward Indian interests stemming from his involvement in a
tribal land deal in which trust land was reportedly exploited for private benefit in
the construction of a 1400-seat bingo hall and a cigarette shop.282
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2. The Assignment of Negative Values to Difference
During excavation for a city parking garage in Tampa in 1979, bones of 140
Seminole Indians were unearthed on the site.283 The discovery threatened to bring
the parking garage project to a halt, but the Seminoles proposed to move their
ancestors’ remains to new land as a solution if they could obtain the necessary
space.284 Tampa and Florida officials accepted the offer, and federal officials,
including Gibbons, helped the tribe obtain new trust land for this purpose. The
Seminoles did, in fact, rebury the bones and erect a museum above the tomb.285
They also, however, constructed a cigarette shop and large bingo parlor, both
financed by a private partnership that in exchange received 47% of the proceeds
from the two operations.286
Just as municipal entities such as fire departments had long generated
operational revenues from bingo, 287 commercial gaming on Indian reservations in
the United States began modestly as a response to a fire that destroyed two trailers
on the Oneida Indian reservation in Verona, New York in 1975. The reservation
had neither a fire department nor fire-fighting equipment, and two Oneidas
perished in the blaze. To prevent such tragedies in the future, reported a tribal
representative, the Oneidas decided “to raise money for [their] own fire
department… the way all fire departments raise money: through bingo.”288
The Oneidas launched a bingo game in an oversized trailer, offering prizes in
excess of the limits permitted by New York law.289 The Oneidas maintained that
because they were an Indian nation, they were not bound by state bingo
regulations. Tribe members claimed that their right of sovereignty entitled them to
run their own game and to offer a jackpot large enough to draw non-Indians—and
their money—to a place they otherwise might never visit.
The Seminoles began their own high-stakes bingo game in Hollywood,
Florida, in 1979. The Seminole tribe contracted with a non-Indian organization to
build and manage its bingo hall. The agreement called for the managers to receive
45% of the profits after repayment of a $1 million construction loan. The enterprise
was a success, and the Seminoles repaid the loan in less than six months. 290 The
Seminoles also fought the state in the courts when Florida authorities tried to close
the Seminoles’ bingo hall in 1981. The tribe argued that Florida did not have the
authority to prohibit gaming on the Seminole reservation. Ultimately, the Fifth
283
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Circuit agreed, 291 relying upon the Supreme Court’s holding in Bryan v. Itasca
County292 that under P.L. 280,293 if a state regulates but does not prohibit an
activity, it may not prohibit that same activity in Indian Country. Thus the
Seminoles secured the right to run their bingo game and pay out unrestricted
prizes.
Although the Seminoles had always indicated to officials that they planned to
use their new land for economic development projects, Gibbons and other officials
were “incensed” and accused the tribe of “hiding its true intentions about the use of
the land.”294 With its negative view of commercial activity by the Seminoles, and
with Gibbons’ support, Florida unsuccessfully sued to halt the activities of the tribe
by challenging the trust status of the land in Tampa.295 By all available accounts
Representative Gibbons held a lasting hostility toward Indian interests as a result
of the Seminole burial ground episode.296
3. Generalization
Representative Gibbons’ reported hostility is not limited to the tribe in his
district, however, as he held a particular suspicion that Indians anywhere could not
be trusted and would use any opportunity to finance undesirable gambling
operations.297 In his letter to Treasury Secretary James Baker, he insinuated that
the tribes were not really acting as governments and used the leveraged buyouts as
exemplars, all the while ignoring that the revenue generated by those projects went
to fund essential governmental functions. 298 If not the first, Gibbons was certainly
one of the early congressional leaders to put forward the generalized notion that
any commercial or revenue generating activity was somehow less “governmental”
if it was conducted by a tribe, as that would make it a “far cry from schools, streets
and sewers.”299 This generalization clearly privileged, to the detriment of the
tribes, the commercial elements of many state and local governmental enterprises
that are funded with tax-exempt debt.300
Various accounts have confirmed that Gibbons’ grudge prompted him to join
the Tribal Tax Act Conference for the purpose of denying tribes meaningful bond
291
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authority.301 Author Emma Gross wrote in 1989 that Gibbons’ “disillusionment
with his Indian constituency is supposed to be the reason that he currently opposes
Indian interests.”302 Although Representative Gibbons developed an accepted
reputation as hostile toward tribal interests in his district, his animosity extended to
tribal interests everywhere.
4. Justification of Hostility
Gibbon’s belief that Indians in general are not trustworthy issuers of public
debt coupled with his powerful position in the House led to the adverse outcomes
in 1982 and again in 1987. Is it possible that Gibbons’ justifications for hostile
treatment of tribal tax-exempt debt were based on something other than a negative
perception of difference between tribal governments and other state and local
governments? Gibbons did have a reputation as an active opponent of PABs. He
has been described in various reports as “a longtime opponent of tax-exempt,
private-activity bonds,”303 as having “maintained a steady opposition to privateactivity bonds,”304 and as “traditionally … an antagonist toward public finance.”305
Thus, it might be reasonable to argue that Gibbons opposed broad tribal bonding
authority not necessarily because he was hostile to Indian interest, but, rather,
because he was hostile toward broad tax-based public finance authority in general.
This argument fails for two reasons. First, Gibbons not only increased his
opposition to tax-exempt bond authority in the case of the Tribal Tax Status Act,
but also supported “tax-exempt financing when it would benefit his (non-Indian)
constituents.”306 Gibbons’ effort to create a new category of tax-exempt bonds to
finance the construction and improvement of space centers in Florida307 indicates
that he was perfectly willing to support broad-based bonding authority when
Indian tribes were not the beneficiaries. Second, the record is clear that the
limitations on tribal bond authority not applicable to states or municipalities have
been enacted “largely at Gibbons’ urging.”308 Thus, the efforts of Representative
Gibbons, albeit with the consent of the other conferees, imposed a drastic
limitation on tribes that, to this day, gives them access only to a narrow sector of
the tax-free capital market. It is undeniable that Gibbons largely created what
today remains a blatant discrepancy between tribes’ and states’ bonding authority.
The timing of Gibbons’ legislative efforts as well as his 1987 letter to Treasury
301
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Secretary James Baker complaining about tribal tax-exempt bonds309 is also
suspicious. In 1986, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in the litigation regarding
the Seminole’s land-into-trust application for the Tampa property,310 so having lost
in the effort to fight tribal economic development in his own district, Gibbons
expanded his efforts in 1987 to thwart economic development throughout Indian
County.
The results of Gibbon’s hostility is self-evident. Because of the additional
restrictions imposed on Indian tribes that do not apply to state and local
governments, tribes cannot issue PABs similar to those issued by state and local
governments,311 nor can they issue tax-exempt debt unless “substantially all” of the
borrowed proceeds pass the ill-defined essential governmental function test.
B. Applying the Memmi Typology to IRS Enforcement Activity
Through its enforcement activities, the IRS continues to propagate this racism
in the Tax Code. Although the legislative restrictions resulted from demonstrably
racist motives, the IRS has chosen to pursue the most restrictive interpretation
possible in its enforcement, exacerbating the racist effect. In fairness to the IRS,
however, it does not have the freedom to ignore or fail to enforce a racist statute.
On the other hand, the enforcement actions of the IRS suggest that it is further
exacerbating the racist impact of §7871 by pursuing an extremely narrow, and
arguably incorrect, interpretation of the statute.
1. The Strategy of Difference
Although tribes are not states, the direct congressional intent of the Tribal Tax
Status Act was to treat tribes like states. In the eyes of the IRS, however, if a tribe
is involved with a commercial activity, it is somehow less of a government, even if
the revenues from that activity fund basic governmental functions. The IRS does
not seem to take the same position with states that are involved with commercial
activities, such as state-run liquor stores in New Hampshire, state operated hotels
resorts, and convention centers, or public golf courses. Thus the perception of
difference between tribal commercial activity and state commercial activity is a
false difference. Nonetheless, the IRS continues to insist that such a difference is
meaningful relative to tribes. For example, Charles Anderson of the IRS’s taxexempt bond enforcement program, speaking about the Pauite golf course, recently
stated:
However, anyone other than the law firm issuing an unqualified opinion and
maybe being sued by a tribe would concede that a hypothetical golf complex having multiple prestige courses in a resort town with a website advertising
309
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planned hotels and casinos, and who has marketed the courses in partnership
with travel promoters - is essentially commercial in nature.312

Anderson continued:
If there are more golf holes than tribal members it is probably commercial
and intended solely for tourists. If no tribal members work there and they all
collect a dividend, it is probably commercial. I don't think Congress ever
anticipated several dozen people getting six-figure checks due to a resort
financed by tax-exempt bonds.313

Standing in stark contrast, the Maryland Board of Public Works, in 1996,
approved the sale of $26 million in tax-exempt revenue bonds as partial funding
for a golf resort in western Maryland.314 State officials indicated that the stateowned golf resort would include a 220-room hotel and a public golf course,
designed by Jack Nicklaus, on the grounds of Rocky Gap State Park and is a longplanned economic development project for Alleghany County.315
2. The Assignment of Negative Values to Difference
Anderson’s words strongly suggest an imposition of a negative value on
tribal commercial activities, as does an August 9, 2006 advance notice of proposed
rulemaking from the IRS. In that notice, the IRS suggests that tribal bonds would
only be tax exempt if 1) Numerous State and local governments with general
taxing powers have been conducting the activity and financing it with tax-exempt
governmental bonds; 2) State and local governments with general taxing powers
have been conducting the activity and financing it with tax-exempt governmental
bonds for many years, and 3) the activity is not a commercial or industrial activity,
even if states and local governments routinely engage in such activities for
commercial purposes. Clearly the IRS has a strongly negative view of tribal
commercial activity relative to state and local governmental commercial activity.
3. Generalization
Since the Tax code applies to all tribes equally, the generalization of the
negative view of tribal commercial activity is automatic, and tribes throughout the
United States have been victims of this aggressive enforcement of a racist statute,
resulting in a demonstrably stifling effect on tribes’ tax-free bonding authority. The
communications from some at the IRS seem to give the impression that the IRS
believes that all tribes are wealthy tribes engaged in gaming and are thus not
entitled to tax-exempt treatment, since they would merely be receiving a subsidy
for commercial activity. This generalization of tribal economic status is
particularly harmful to poorer tribes, as these restrictions on the scope of what can
be financed with tax-exempt debt in particular deny poor tribes the opportunity to
address their glaring infrastructure and economic development needs. Tribes with
312
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substantial natural resources or significant gaming operations have the option of
financing certain activities on a taxable basis even if, absent a restrictive Tax Code,
they would be able to finance those activities on a tax-exempt basis. As mentioned
earlier, however, poorer tribes do not have that luxury, and upwards of $50 billion
in annual capital needs go unmet in Indian Country, in part because the debt
service required to finance the projects to meet those needs is too expensive at
taxable rates.
The IRS’s generalization of the restrictive provision of §7871 to all tribes has
also meant a substantially higher audit risk for tribal bonds, as tribal governments
are also victims of a demonstrably disproportionate number of IRS enforcement
actions. Less than 1% of the tax-exempt municipal offerings are audited by the IRS
each year, but direct tribal tax-exempt issuances are 30 times more likely to be
audited within four years of issue,316 and 100% of tribal conduit issuances have
been or are currently being challenged by the IRS.317 In all of these cases, the tribes
financed activities that had previously been financed by state and local
governments without any challenge from the IRS.
In the specific instance of the Paiute golf course audit, in arguing that that the
golf course was not “intended to meet the recreational needs of [the] Tribe or that
it is anything other than a commercial enterprise of [the] Tribe,”318 the IRS is
apparently making another generalization that Indians do not play golf, and if they
do play golf, they only play at courses that would never attract a non-Indian golfer.
4. Justification of Hostility
In a recently issued Technical Advice Memorandum (“TAM”),319 the IRS
justified its hostility towards tribal conduit financing by suggesting that allowing
tribes to use the conduit mechanism would “would run counter to Congressional
intent.”320 Even though the very legislative history cited in the TAM suggests that
water treatment plants fall squarely within the definition of an essential
governmental function,321 the IRS is nonetheless challenging the tax-exempt bonds
issued by the Morongo tribe for “water and wastewater system improvements,
roadway improvements, and public parking facilities.”322
As discussed earlier, the IRS’s most publicized enforcement of the essential
governmental function test occurred in August of 2002 when the IRS advised the
Las Vegas Paiutes that construction of a public golf course is “other than an
essential governmental function within the meaning of § 7871(e).”323 The IRS
advised that it would deny the tax-exemption based on its reading of the
316
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“customary use” definition provided by the 1987 amendment. The IRS
acknowledged that “it is likely that construction and operation of golf courses are
customary governmental functions,” but nonetheless concluded that the admittedly
commercial nature of the project rendered it outside the scope of the tribe’s taxfree bond authority as limited by section 7871(e). The IRS reasoned that Congress
did not define “customarily” in the statute and that “there is an argument” that such
commercial ventures cannot be considered within section 7871(e). Section 7871(e)
simply defines “essential governmental function” as excluding projects “not
customarily performed by State and local governments.” It says nothing of the
commercial or non-commercial nature of those activities.324 Mary J. Streitz of
Dorsey & Whitney explains that
[o]ver-relying on selected portions of the legislative history, the FSA
suggested that tribal governments may not finance “commercial or industrial
facilities” with tax-exempt bonds even where such facilities satisfy the
customary performance test. Although the House Ways and Means
Committee had indicated a concern about tribal governments financing
commercial and industrial activities with tax-exempt bonds, the committee
chose to adopt only the customary performance test to address its concerns.325

Streitz concludes that “[t]he entire legislative history reinforces that the statutory
test turns on the frequency of a government practice, not on any other
requirement.”326
The argument set forth by the IRS is that the golf course was not “intended to
meet the recreational needs of [the] Tribe or that it is anything other than a
commercial enterprise of [the] Tribe.”327 Although other public golf courses can be
considered essential governmental functions, in this case “the probable role of the
Golf Course in the community contrasts with that of the more typical golf course
developed by a state or local government.”328 Given the unlikelihood that tribal
members would use the course for recreational uses, the “Golf Course could be
seen as disproportionate when viewed as a community amenity, making the
balance between community recreation and commercial implications more
significantly tilted toward the latter than is likely to be typical.”329 Mary Streitz
counters that, in this analysis, the FSA overlooks the fact that “many state and
local government golf courses are “destination” golf courses intended to attract
visitors from outside the community in which the golf course is located, thus
promoting economic development in the community and raising revenues for the
state or local government” (emphasis in original).330 Therefore, the FSA essentially
says that Indian tribes cannot utilize tax-free debt to construct golf courses and
accompanying club houses if the courses pass a subjective line of being too nice
for tribal members. One wonders if the same public course in a place like Palm
324
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Beach would encounter these same difficulties. The FSA admits that all publicly
built and operated golf courses “are developed to enhance the lifestyle of both
golfing and non-golfing citizens of the community and perhaps to create jobs,” but
nonetheless denies the tribe’s admitted effort to “further the economic
development of [the] Tribe and to reduce [the] Tribe’s dependence on” its limited
available resources,331 because these are commercial rather than recreational
pursuits.
The FSA noted that “[t]he legislative history of § 7871(e) indicates that
Congress meant not to include commercial or industrial facilities as essential
governmental functions even if such functions were commonly financed with taxexempt bonds by state or local governments.”332 Indeed, the legislative history
indicates that tribes were faced with a more limited authority than states and
municipalities. As noted above, the House Committee Report on the 1987
amendment stated that only customarily publicly-financed projects are intended to
be within the tribes’ authority, “notwithstanding that isolated instances of a state or
local government issuing bonds for another activity may occur.”333 Thus, the IRS
at once acknowledged that “there were at least 2,645 public golf courses in
1998…and it is probable that the number has grown,”334 and in the same FSA
memorandum, relied on legislative history deeming projects that may be financed
by states with tax-free bonds “in isolated instances” beyond tribal authority.
The FSA recommended not litigating the bond exemption because it would “be
difficult to argue that Golf Course is so commercial in nature that state and local
governments would not own and operate similar enterprises.”335 Additionally, it
acknowledged that “some courts, including the Tenth Circuit, have adopted the
principle that federal statutes are to be construed liberally in favor of Native
Americans, with ambiguous provisions interpreted to their benefit.”336 In short, the
IRS’ position was untenable based on existing public practices and judicial rulings,
but it nonetheless proceeded with hostile enforcement actions.
The 2002 FSA has inspired a number of criticisms, most recently in the form
of a report issued by the Advisory Committee to the Internal Revenue Service on
Tax Exempt and Government Entities (“ACT”).337 The ACT Report is harshly
critical of the FSA, emphasizing that public golf courses are in fact customarily
owned and operated by state and local governments. The ACT Report further
requests that the IRS cease any new audits and enforcement initiatives, withdraw
the 2002 FSA memorandum, and most importantly, clarify that essential
governmental functions for purposes of section 7871 be construed in accordance
with the term “essential governmental function” as it is used in section 115 of the
331
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Internal Revenue Code for benefits accruing to state and local governments.338
Section 115 provides that gross income “does not include income derived from
any public utility or the exercise of any essential governmental function and
accruing to a state or any political subdivision thereof.”339 The IRS takes a broad
view of what is excludable under section 115.340 In determining whether the entity
can exclude its income from federal income tax liability, the IRS employs a threepart test: 1) whether the entity makes or saves money for a state or local
government, 2) whether its assets revert to the state upon dissolution, and 3)
whether there is any private benefit.341 In a sharp contrast to its approach in the
2002 FSA to defining an essential governmental function as excluding any
commercial activity, the IRS has reasoned that a state investment fund for cash
balances constitutes an essential governmental function because “it may be
assumed that Congress did not desire in any way to restrict a state’s participation in
enterprises that might be useful in carrying out those projects desirable from the
standpoint of the state government which, on a broad consideration of the question,
may be the function of the sovereign to conduct.”342
As mentioned earlier, several states have even issued tax-exempt bonds in
support of their gaming operations such as lotteries and horse racing.343 Similarly,
a number of municipalities have financed hotels and convention centers with taxexempt bonds.344 Given the uncertainty as to whether these activities have reached
a level of “customary” occurrence, tribes have thus far been unable to borrow
directly on a tax-exempt basis to finance their own casinos or other gaming
facilities.345 For purposes of section 115, however, the IRS has, without
intervention by Congress, effectively defined any activity that makes or saves the
government money as an essential governmental function. This definition
encompasses the very purpose of the Las Vegas Paiute Golf Course, which the IRS
has reasoned does not qualify as an essential governmental function.346
Despite the arguably racist heritage of the essential governmental function test,
the IRS is also using that test to justify its hostility against tribal conduit financing.
Despite the formal legality of the conduit arrangements, the IRS has begun to
scrutinize conduit borrowing engaged in by Indian tribes, arguing that “[i]n
general, any transaction done indirectly that cannot be done directly is
troubling.”347
All the tribal conduit borrowings have been reported as under scrutiny by the
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IRS.348 One involves two hotel and casino complexes in Florida built by the
Seminole Tribe, one in Tampa and one in Hollywood. These projects together
utilized $345 million in tax-exempt bonds.349 The conduit issue for these projects
was the Capital Trust Agency, an entity created by the city of Gulf Breeze and the
town of Century, both in Florida.350 Another publicly scrutinized conduit
borrowing involves the Cabazon Band of Mission Indians in which the California
Statewide Communities Development Authority issued $145 million in tax-exempt
bonds.351 In the Cabazon case, the tribe received a letter from the IRS indicating
that the tribe “may have issued an obligation substantially all of the proceeds of
which were not to be used in an exercise of an essential governmental function of
the tribe.”352 The IRS recently issued a technical advice memorandum taking the
position that tribal proceeds from conduit financings are subject to the “essential
governmental function” test.353 This memorandum was criticized by Mark A.
Jarboe of Dorsey & Whitney LLP as an instance of the IRS taking “a resultsoriented approach to creating an ambiguity because of what they think Congress
meant rather that what Congress said.”354
Aside from the IRS’s investigation of this method of tribal financing, conduit
financing itself is a far less efficient method of accessing tax-free debt than direct
issuance by a tribe. Consider the Seminole case, where issuance costs amounted to
9.2% of the bond proceeds.355 These fees cut into the amount available for
investment in the tribal enterprise, making the tribe’s income-generating effort less
348
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effective and certainly far less efficient than a direct issuance. Clearly, the source
of this method of debt-financing, untoward, in the eyes of the IRS, and expensive,
for tribes, is an outgrowth of the stifling effect of the essential governmental
function requirement on tribes’ direct access to the tax-free market. The conduit
approach would be altogether unnecessary, however, if the discriminatory aspects
of §7871 were eliminated.
CONCLUSION
A. The Policy Reasons for Expanding Indian Tribes’ Tax-Free Bond Authority
In the past the federal government has shifted its policy toward American
Indians with the policy ranging from evacuation of Indians from their native lands
in a “trail of tears” to a “reorganization” effort to anglicize Indians to complete
“termination” of the tribal structure.356 In the late 1960s the federal government
abandoned the policy of termination in favor of the policy of tribal “selfdetermination” in order to strengthen both the federal government’s service
programs for Indian tribes and increase the ability of tribes to design and operate
their own programs.357 Commentators have described the failed effort in 1975 to
place tribes on equal footing with states in the Tax Code as part of this era of selfdetermination efforts.358 The authority to supplement tax revenue by issuing taxfree debt obligations is clearly a major part of any state’s efforts to develop and
maintain its infrastructure and economy.359 The policy of self-determination, along
with the legal recognition of tribes as governments with responsibilities to their
constituent populations, necessitates tax-free bond authority.
Yet tribes, to this day, and as a direct consequence of the essential
governmental function requirement, do not enjoy such authority to any meaningful
degree. Not only are these restrictions discriminatory against Indian tribes,
inconsistent with the federal policy of self-determination and contrary to the legal
recognition of tribes as governments, but also they are a stifling repression of the
efforts of the historically most impoverished, isolated, and disaffected minority
group360 in the nation to improve their daily lives. Indeed, although the law now
technically grants tribes tax-free bond authority, the essential governmental
function test in realty renders this power one that exists in theory only.361
Williams concluded that the 1982 legislation and its failure to provide the
much needed tax-free bond authority equal to that of states indicated both that
“Congress ignored the express desires of the Indian tribes,” and that “non-Indian
policymakers are still insensitive to Indian preferences – an attitude that has
356
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characterized the long and dismal history of federal Indian development policy.”362
Even today, most Indian tribes find themselves in a territorially remote location,
cut off from easy access to capital markets, out of sight and mind from investors,
and stuck with a crippling, third-world level of infrastructure.363
In addition to the investment and employment issues, most tribes’ lack of a
natural and diversified tax base also limits their ability to raise revenue.364 The lack
of a tax base both heightens the need for alternative sources of revenue, such as
tax-free debt, and hinders the ability to issue general obligation bonds backed by
the full faith and credit of the tribe.365 Thus, in the arena of tax-free bonds,
allowing tribes to use debt obligations to finance projects normally provided by the
private sector but lacking in Indian country, such as mortgage bonds or owner
occupied housing, would be a sensible and fair policy. In enacting tribal bond
legislation, however, Congress has chosen not to consider alternatives that would
address these deeply rooted obstacles facing tribes. Despite the rhetoric paid to
recognizing tribes as governments and equalizing their tax treatment with that of
states, Congress gave tribes a limited authority to utilize tax-free debt obligations
that resulted in only seven known issuances.366 Even with this small use of this
limited bond authority, Representative Gibbons spearheaded an effort in Congress
that further limited tribes’ bonding abilities. The result is that tribes are effectively
limited to their general obligation bonding capabilities, which, as noted earlier, is
largely illusory for economically strapped Indian tribes.
This problem is particularly acute for poor tribes. Tribes with substantial
natural resources or significant gaming operations have the option of financing
certain activities on a taxable basis even if, absent a racist Tax Code, they would
be able to finance those activities on a tax-exempt basis. Poorer tribes, however, do
not have that luxury, and more than $50 billion in annual capital needs still go
unmet in Indian Country,367 in part because the debt service required to finance the
projects to meet those needs is too expensive at taxable rates.
Given the level of “commercial” activity by states and local governments that
is funded with tax-exempt debt, the expanding hostility towards revenue
generating activity by tribal governments is indefensible in any intellectually
honest manner. Congress itself has recently passed legislation that acknowledges
that tribally sponsored commercial activities can nonetheless be essential
governmental functions.368 This recent pronouncement provides an opening for
362
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Congress to act on the issue of tribal tax-exempt bonds. Tribal governments need
the ability to issue tax-exempt debt on the same basis as state and local
governments. To continue to deny them such ability is to continue to foster a racist
Tax Code.

B. Proposed Legislative Solution
As discussed in Part II, tribes are similarly situated to states in terms of their
governmental obligations to their citizens. Tribes also enjoy a significant degree of
sovereignty as domestic dependent nations. Therefore, tribes should, as a matter of
both policy and equity, enjoy an identical status as states in the Tax Code,
including the broad ability to issue tax-free debt. Although legislative proposals
have been offered in the past that would put rectify the inequities in §7871 and put
tribal debt on an equal footing with municipal debt for tax law purposes, such
legislation has yet to pass.369
Indian tribes have for centuries existed in a kind of dual world where they are
sovereigns for some purposes but treated as if their governmental responsibilities
are not real for other purposes. The Tax Code’s restriction on tribal tax-free
bonding authority is an example of the latter. This restriction is an unjustifiable
discrimination against Indian tribes by the Congress in the enacting legislation and
by the IRS in its enforcement actions. Moreover, the official federal policy of
Indian Tribal Self-Determination requires meaningful access to the tax-free bond
market if it is to be successful.
The Supreme Court’s view of economic development as an essential
governmental function bears repeating:
Promoting economic development is a traditional and long accepted
governmental function, and there is no principled way of distinguishing it
from the other public purposes the Court has recognized.370

Unfortunately, the Supreme Court was not opining on an Indian law case but was
instead discussing economic development in the municipal context.
what emerged from the Conference Committee ultimately enacted into law appears to almost
completely remove the availability of the exemption for tribes and related entities. Interestingly,
however, Section 906 of the Act provides that a “governmental plan” will include “a plan which is
established and maintained by an Indian tribal government..., a subdivision of an Indian tribal
government..., or an agency or instrumentality of either, and all of the participants of which are
employees of such entity substantially all of whose services as such an employee are in the
performance of essential government functions but not in the performance of commercial activities
(whether or not an essential government function)” (emphasis added). This statutory language
clearly states that a revenue generating activity, although commercial in nature, can still be an
essential government function, thus eviscerating the basis upon which the IRS has generally opposed
tax-exempt bond financings under the “essential governmental function” test. Section 906 itself is
clearly discriminatory, as pension plans for employees of state-run enterprises such as the liquor store
employees of the New Hampshire State Liquor Commission are still able to enjoy the “governmental
plan” exemption from ERISA, but a single employee of a tribal gift shop for a tribe with no other
commercial activities would deny the entire tribe the ability to have their pension treated as a
governmental plan.
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Under the status quo, the Tax Code and the IRS are systematically
discriminating against tribal governments relative to state and local governments.
Congress has the opportunity to rectify this differential treatment simply by
rewriting section 7871 to treat tribes as states for all tax purposes, without
qualification:
Sec. 7871. Indian tribal governments treated as states for certain purposes.
(a) General rule. An Indian tribal government shall be treated as a State-(1) for purposes of determining whether and in what amount any contribution or
transfer to or for the use of such government (or a political subdivision thereof) is
deductible under-(A) section 170 [26 USCS § 170] (relating to income tax deduction for charitable,
etc., contributions and gifts),
(B) sections 2055 and 2106(a)(2) [26 USCS §§ 2055 and 2106(a)(2)] (relating to
estate tax deduction for transfers of public, charitable, and religious uses), or
(C) section 2522 [26 USCS § 2522] (relating to gift tax deduction for charitable
and similar gifts);
(2) for purposes of any exemption from, credit or refund of, or payment with respect
to, an excise tax imposed by-(A) chapter 31 [26 USCS §§ 4001 et seq.] (relating to tax on special fuels),
(B) chapter 32 [26 USCS §§ 4064 et seq.] (relating to manufacturers excise
taxes),
(C) subchapter B of chapter 33 [26 USCS §§ 4251 et seq.] (relating to
communications excise tax), or
(D) subchapter D of chapter 36 [26 USCS §§ 4481 et seq.] (relating to tax on use
of certain highway vehicles);
(3) for purposes of section 164 [26 USCS § 164] (relating to deduction for taxes);
(4) for purposes of section 103 [26 USCS § 103] (relating to state and local
bonds);
(5) for purposes of section 511(a)(2)(B) [26 USCS § 511(a)(2)(B)] (relating to the
taxation of colleges and universities which are agencies or instrumentalities of
governments or their political subdivisions);
(6) for purposes of-(A) section 105(e) [26 USCS § 105(e)] (relating to accident and health plans),
(B) section 403(b)(1)(A)(ii) [26 USCS § 403(b)(1)(A)(ii)] (relating to the
taxation of contributions of certain employers for employee annuities), and
(C) section 454(b)(2) [26 USCS § 454(b)(2)] (relating to discount
obligations); and
(7) for purposes of-(A) chapter 41 [26 USCS §§ 4911 et seq.] (relating to tax on excess
expenditures to influence legislation), and
(B) subchapter A of chapter 42 [26 USCS §§ 4940 et seq.] (relating to private
foundations).
(b) Treatment of subdivisions of Indian tribal governments as political subdivisions.
For the purposes specified in subsection (a), a subdivision of an Indian tribal government
shall be treated as a political subdivision of a State if such subdivision has been delegated
the right to exercise one or more of the substantial governmental functions of the Indian
tribal government.
(Sections (c), (d), and (e) should be repealed).

For the sake of consistent federal policy toward Indian tribes, for the sake of
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tribes’ right to economic independence, and for the sake of eliminating a harmful
and discriminatory law, Congress should act to equalize tribal bond authority with
that of states.

C. Positive Federal Revenue Impact
In addition to the policy rationale for eliminating racism in the tax code by
equalizing tribal tax-exempt bonding authority, such an expansion would actually
increase federal tax revenues. Given the high levels of unemployment throughout
Indian Country, there are no labor market constraints, and thus any jobs created as
a result of projects funded with tax-exempt bonds will likely be filled by
previously unemployed individuals. Those individuals will pay income and social
security taxes, and their employers will contribute additional payroll taxes. Even
without factoring in the reduction in welfare transfer payments that result from
increased employment and increased per capita income, economic models clearly
demonstrate the positive federal revenue impact of increase tribal bonding
authority.371
Conversely, the maintenance of the current restrictions on tribal tax-exempt
bonding authority have a negative impact on federal tax revenues. Since these
restrictions keep otherwise viable projects from being funded, the federal treasury
is losing out on tax revenues that would otherwise be generated in the absence of
these restrictions. Sound fiscal logic and the obvious policy imperative strongly
suggest that Congress should eliminate the racist restrictions on tribal tax-exempt
bonding authority.
***
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